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Abstract 
 
Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and 
corporate control.  In this article, we document and examine the nature of hedge fund 
activism, how and why it differs from activism by traditional institutional investors, and 
its implications for corporate governance and regulatory reform.  We argue that hedge 
fund activism differs from activism by traditional institutions in several ways: it is 
directed at significant changes in individual companies (rather than small, systemic 
changes), it entails higher costs, and it is strategic and ex ante (rather than intermittent 
and ex post).  The reasons for these differences may lie in the incentive structures of 
hedge fund managers as well as in the fact that traditional institutions face regulatory 
barriers, political constraints, or conflicts of interest that make activism less profitable 
than it is for hedge funds.  But the differences may also be due to the fact that traditional 
institutions pursue a diversification strategy that is difficult to combine with strategic 
activism.  
Although hedge funds hold great promise as active shareholders, their intense 
involvement in corporate governance and control also potentially raises two kinds of 
problems:  The interests of hedge funds sometimes diverge from those of their fellow 
shareholders; and the intensity of hedge fund activism imposes substantial stress that the 
regulatory system may not be able to withstand.  The resulting problems, however, are 
relatively isolated and narrow, do not broadly undermine the value of hedge fund 
activism as a whole, and do not warrant major additional regulatory interventions.   
The sharpest accusation leveled against activist funds is that activism is designed 
to achieve a short-term payoff at the expense of long-term profitability.  Although we 
consider this a potentially serious problem that arguably pervades hedge fund activism, 
we conclude that a sufficient case for legal intervention has not been made.  This 
conclusion results from the uncertainties about whether short-termism is in fact a real 
problem and how much hedge fund activism is driven by excessive short-termism. But, 
most importantly, it stems from our view that market forces and adaptive devices taken 
by companies individually are better designed than regulation to deal with the potential 
negative effects of hedge fund short-termism while preserving the positive effects of 
hedge-fund activism.   
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 Introduction 
 
 Hedge funds1 have become critical players in both corporate governance and 
corporate control.  Over the last few months, hedge funds have pressured McDonalds to 
spin-off major assets in an IPO;2 asked Time-Warner to change its business strategy;3 
threatened or commenced proxy contests over H.J. Heinz,4 Massey Energy,5 KT&G,6 
infoUSA,7 Sitel,8 and GenCorp;9 made a bid to acquire Houston Exploration;10 pushed for 
a merger between Euronext and Deutsche Boerse;11 pushed for changes in management 
and strategy at Nabi Biopharmaceuticals;12 opposed acquisitions by Novartis of the 
remaining 58% stake in Chiron,13 by Sears Holdings of the 46% minority interest in Sears 
Canada,14 by Micron of Lexar Media,15 and by a group of private equity firms of VNU;16 
                                                 
1 For purposes of this article, hedge funds are funds exempt from regulation under the Investment Company 
Act that invest primarily in publicly traded securities or financial derivatives.  See 
www.hedgefund.com/abouthfs/what/what.htm (defining hedge funds in a similar way).   
 
2  Big Shareholder of McDonald’s Urges Asset IPO, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 2005, at A6; Hedge-Fund Man at 
McDonalds’s, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 2005, at C1 (noting pressure by Pershing Square, a hedge fund, in 
McDonald’s Corp., to sell company-owned restaurants). 
 
3 Andrew Ross Sorkin & Richard Siklos, Icahn Tries to Form a Team to Take On Time Warner, NYT, Aug. 
10, 2005, printout; Julia Angwin, Icahn Issues Time Warner Challenge – Financier Confirms Alliance With 
Other Investors to Seek Changes at Media Company, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 2005, at A3. 
 
4 Janey Adamy & David Reilley, Heinz Says Investor’s Company Plans to Nominate 5 Directors, Wall St. 
J., Mar. 4, 2006, at B2. 
  
5 AP Wire, Investment Company Wants Representation on Massey’s Board, Mar. 17, 2006 
 
6 Seon-Jin Cha, Icahn Group Demands access to KT&G Books, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 2006 at C4; Laura 
Santini, Icahn Group Lands KT&G Board Seat, Wall St. J., mar. 17, 2006 at C4.. 
 
7 InfoUSA tells shareholders to ignore hedge fund, Reuters, May 4, 2006. 
 
8 JANA Partners LLC Announces SITEL Board Nominees and Intention to Replace Additional Board 
Members, PRNewswire, Nov. 23, 2005. 
 
9  Shareholder Revolt Rocks GenCorp, TMCnet, Apr. 1, 2006. 
 
10 Marietta Cauch, Jana Partners Sets Energy Bid in Unusual Move for Hedge Fund, Wall St. J., June 13, 
2006 (reporting bid by Jana for Houston Exploration). 
 
11 Hedge Funds Push for Merger of Deutsche Boerse & Euronext, Hedge Fund Street Newsletter, Nov. 23, 
2005; Nick Clark & Vivek Ahuja, Hedge Fund Forces Euronext Merger Vote, Financial News Online US, 
Apr. 14, 2006. 
 
12 Robert Steyer, Hedge Funds Take Aim at Nabi, The Street.com, April 26, 2006. 
 
13 ValueAct Refuses to Talk to Chiron about Deal, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 2006; Shareholder Insurrection 
Infects Novaritis’s $5.1 billion Chiron Bid, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 2006, at C3. 
 
14 Gary Norris, Sears Holdings Says it will Own 100% of Sears Canada, CANOE Money, Apr. 7, 2006. 
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threatened litigation against Delphi;17 and pushed for litigation against Calpine that lead 
to the ouster of its top two executives.18
 
Even though most hedge funds are not activist,19 the ones that are have captured 
the attention.  Martin Lipton, the renowned advisor to corporate boards and veteran of the 
takeover wars of the 1980s, lists “attacks by activist hedge funds” as the number one key 
issue for directors.20  The Wall Street Journal, the newspaper of record for executives, 
bankers, and investment professionals, calls hedge funds the “new leader” on the “list of 
bogeymen haunting the corporate boardroom.”21 The Economist runs special reports on 
Shareholder Democracy focusing on activism by hedge funds.22  And several European 
governments are weighing regulations designed to curb activist hedge funds.23
 
What shall we make out of the spate of shareholder activism by hedge funds?  Are 
hedge funds the “Holy Grail” of corporate governance – the long sought-after shareholder 
champion with the incentives and expertise to protect shareholder interests in the publicly 
held firm?  Or do they represent darker forces, in search for quick profit opportunities at 
the expense of other shareholders and the long-term health of the economy?   
 
In this Article, we analyze and evaluate the implications of the rise of hedge funds 
for corporate governance and corporate control.  In Part I, we examine and categorize a 
variety of presumptively “happy stories,” that is, examples of different kinds of hedge 
fund activism where hedge funds have no apparent conflict of interest.  We will argue 
that this hedge fund activism differs, quantitatively and qualitatively, from the more 
moderate forms of activism that traditional institutional investors engage in.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Jeff Chappell, Hedge Fund Investors Question Lexar-Micron Deal, EcectronicNews, Apr. 25, 2006. 
 
16 Jason Singer, Knight Presses VNU Overhaul Plan, Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 2006 at C4. 
 
17 Jeffrey McCracken, Delphi Ripped for Bankruptcy Case, Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 2006 at A10. 
 
18 Rebecca Smith, Executives’ Ouster Shows Growing Hedge-Fund Clout, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at A1. 
 
19 See infra Section I.C.  
 
20 Martin Lipton, Wachtell Lipton, Rosen & Katz Client Memo, Dec. 1, 2005; see also Martin Lipton at al., 
Wachtell Lipton, Rosen & Katz Client Memo, Being prepared for Attacks by Activist Hedge Funds, Dec. 
21, 2005 (noting “environment of increased attacks by hedge funds” and advising companies how to deal 
with it); Martin Lipton at al., Wachtell Lipton, Rosen & Katz Client Memo, Attacks by Activist Hedge 
Funds, Mar. 7, 2006 (presenting checklist for clients to deal with activist hedge funds). 
 
21 Alan Murray, Hedge Funds Are New Sheriffs of Boardroom, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 2005, at A2; see also 
Jesse Eisinger, Memo to Activists: Mind CEO Pay, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at C1 (“The shareholder 
activists with the most clout these days are hedge-fund managers …”). 
 
22  Battling for Corporate America, The Economist, Mar. 11, 2006 at 69. 
 
23 Edward Taylor & Alistair McDonald, Hedge Funds Face Europe’s Clippers, Wall St. J., May 23, 2006, at 
C1 (regulations considered by Germany and the Netherlands). 
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In Part II, we analyze why hedge funds are so much more active than other 
institutional investors.  We show that hedge funds have better incentives, are subject to 
fewer regulatory impediments and face fewer conflicts of interest than traditional 
institutions, such as mutual funds and pension funds, who have never lived up to the 
hopes of their partisans.  But the activism of hedge funds may also be due to the fact that 
they follow a different business strategy than traditional institutions.  This strategy 
involves taking high stakes in portfolio companies in order to become activist -- thus 
blurring the lines between betting on and determining the outcome of contests -- rather 
than diversifying one’s investment and becoming involved (if at all) only ex post when 
companies are underperforming. 
 
In Part III, we turn to potential problems generated by hedge fund activism.  We 
first examine the “dark side” of activism -- instances where the interests of activist hedge 
funds conflict with those of their fellow shareholders – to see whether regulatory 
intervention is warranted.  We then discuss other problems that arise from the stress that 
hedge funds put on the governance system. 
 
In Part IV, we turn to the most severe attack leveled against hedge funds: that 
hedge fund activism increases the pressure for short term results over more valuable 
long-term benefits.  We accept that short-termism by hedge funds can aggravate short-
termism in the executive suite. But we nevertheless conclude that at this point no 
regulatory intervention is warranted because it is unclear to what extent hedge fund 
activism is driven by excessive short-termism; because hedge funds usually need the 
support of other, less short-term oriented, constituents to affect corporate policy; and 
because, to the extent short-termism generates a problem, adaptive devices taken by 
corporations are a better way to address it than governmental regulation.24  
 
 
 I. What’s Going on Out There?  Some Illustrative (Happy) Stories 
 
 Hedge funds are emerging as the most dynamic and most prominent shareholder 
activists. On the bright side, this generates the possibility that hedge funds will, in the 
course of making profits for their own investors, help overcome the classic agency 
problem of publicly held corporations by dislodging underperforming managers, 
challenging ineffective strategies, and making sure that merger and control transactions 
make sense for shareholders. In doing so, the bright side holds, hedge funds would 
enhance the value of the companies they invest in for the benefit of both their own 
investors and their fellow shareholders.  In the first section of this Part, we examine and 
categorize the different ways in which hedge funds, without any apparent conflicts of 
interests, have confronted managers demanding changes in management and business 
strategies or getting involved in corporate control transactions.  This section illustrates 
the potential bright side of hedge fund activism. 
                                                 
24 We do not address the question of whether additional regulation is needed to protect hedge fund investors 
from either investment risk or unscrupulous managers. While important and timely, this question is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
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 But the bright side story of hedge funds – of large and sophisticated investors 
standing up to management for the benefit of shareholders at large – has an element of 
déjà vu.  Twenty years ago, similar stories were told about another set of large and 
sophisticated investors: mutual funds, public pension funds, private pension funds, 
insurance companies, or “institutional investors” as they became called.25  But while, on 
the whole, the rise of these traditional institutional investors has probably been beneficial, 
they have hardly proven to be a silver bullet.   
 
 Are there reasons to think that newly prominent hedge funds will be more 
effective?  In section B of this Part, we will start answering this question by comparing 
the activism of hedge funds to the activism of traditional institutions. We will show that 
hedge fund activism differs in degree and type from the activism by traditional 
institutions.   
 
 In the final section of this Part, we place hedge fund activism in the context of 
hedge fund investment strategies more generally. Only a small portion of hedge fund 
assets are devoted to shareholder activism.  Thus, activism does not dominate what hedge 
funds do.  Hedge funds, however, dominate certain modes of activism and – if that 
activism is profitable and more hedge funds asset become devoted to it – the extent of 
hedge fund activism could quickly increase. 
 
 A.  Hedge Funds as Activists 
 
 1. Corporate Governance Activism 
 
 Hedge funds have increasingly tried to influence the business strategy and 
management of corporations.  This activism takes a variety of forms, from public 
pressure on portfolio companies to change the business strategy, to the running of a proxy 
contest to gain seats on the board of directors of portfolio companies, to litigation against 
present of former managers. 
 One of the better known (and more entertaining) activist hedge funds is Third 
Point LLC, which has about $4.0 billion under management.26 Its list of recent targets 
includes Ligand, Salton, Western Gas Resources, Massey Energy, Potlatch, Intercept, 
                                                 
25 See, e.g. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 811 (1991); Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); Mark 
J. Roe, A Political Theory on American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991).  But see, e.g. 
Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional 
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1990); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of 
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); see also Anat R. Admati et al., Large 
Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium.  102 J. Pol. Econ. 1097 (1994) 
(developing model of large shareholder monitoring). 
 
26 James Kelly Joins Third Point As President and Chief Operating Officer, FORBES.COM, Sept. 7, 2005, 
http://www.forbes.com/prnewswire/feeds/prnewswire/2005/09/07/prnewswire200509070915PR_NEWS_B
_MAT_NY_NYW141.html  
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Warnanco, Penn Virginia and Star Gas Partners L.P.27 Star Gas, to pick one of the targets, 
is a heating oil distributor.  Third Point acquired around 6% of its units.28  In addition to 
severely criticizing CEO Irik Sevin’s management of the company, Third Point attacked 
him personally: “It is time for you to step down from your role as CEO and director so 
that you can do what you do best:  retreat to your waterfront mansion in the Hamptons 
where you can play tennis and hobnob with your fellow socialites.”29  The governance 
practices of Star Gas were apparently not ideal.  Thus, Third Point openly wondered:  
[H]ow is it possible that you selected your elderly 78-year-old mom to serve on the 
Company's Board of Directors and as a full-time employee providing employee and 
unitholder services?  We further wonder under what theory of corporate governance 
does one's mom sit on a Company board.  Should you be found derelict in the 
performance of your executive duties, as we believe is the case, we do not believe 
your mom is the right person to fire you from your job.30
The tactic worked.  Bowing to the pressure generated by Third Point, Sevin resigned one 
month later.31   
 Or take the exploits of Barington, another activist hedge fund.  In June 2003, 
Barington nominated three directors to the board of Nautica Enterprises, the sportswear 
company.  At the time, it held about 3.1 percent of Nautica stock.32  Shortly thereafter, 
the company indicated that it was discussing a possible sale.33 Barington subsequently 
convinced Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy voting advisory service, to 
recommend that its clients vote for the two Barington director nominees.34  By July 2003, 
Barington’s tactics had worked: Nautica agreed to be acquired by VF Corporation for 
$587 million35 and Barington dropped its proxy fight.36  The following July, Barrington 
                                                 
27 Innisfree Presentation to Skadden, Arps, Slate Meagher & Flom LLP, Apr. 23, 2006. 
 
28 Third Point Demands That Star Gas CEO, Irik Sevin, Resigns and Returns Keys to Company Car, PR 
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14, 2005, http://www.prnewswire.com. 
 
29 Id. 
 
30 Id. 
 
31 Ron Orol, Fortress GenCorp, DAILY DEAL, March 25, 2005, http://thedeal.com.  Whether this was too 
little too late is an interesting but separate question.  After a brief uptick, Star Gas’s stock price continued 
to decline. 
 
32 Suzanne Kapner, Board Move Lifts Nautica 21 Percent, N.Y. POST, June 12, 2003, at 41. 
 
33 Suzanne Kapner, Nautica Rises 11% on News of Suitor, N.Y. POST, June 21, 2003, at 20. 
 
34 Institutional Shareholder Services Recommends Election of Barington Companies Group Nominees, PR 
NEWSWIRE, July 2, 2003, http://www.prnewswire.com. 
 
35 Sundaramoorthy, Nautica Accepts Dollars 587m VF Bid, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 8, 2003, at 26. 
 
36 Barington Companies Group Reacts Favorably to Proposed Acquisition of Nautica Enterprises by VF 
Corporation, PR NEWSWIRE, July 7, 2003, http://www.prnewswire.com. 
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turned to Steven Madden, Ltd., and urged it to explore “strategic discussions with 
potential acquirers.”37  Barington, which had accumulated a 7.7% stake, sent outside 
directors a strongly worded letter demanding that it hire a more seasoned CEO, reduce 
change in control compensation, reduce conflicts of interest on the board, and  use its 
excess cash to buy back shares and pay dividends.38  By February 2005, the Steve 
Madden board agreed to spend $25 million in 2005 for share repurchases and/or 
dividends and to meet with representatives of Barington on a regular basis in order to 
avoid a proxy fight.39
 
 Carl Icahn, familiar to some from the takeover battles of the 1980s, has returned 
to the headlines by starting a hedge fund, buying blocks in companies and pressuring 
them to change.40 Thus, for example, he teamed up with Jana Partners to take a position 
in Kerr-McGee and push for change. The outcome was a restructuring in which Kerr-
McGee sold off its chemicals unit and its North Sea oil fields.41 He has more recently put 
pressure on Blockbuster, where he gained three board seats; Time Warner, where the 
company agreed to add some independent directors to its board and increase the size of 
its share repurchase program;42  and KT&G, where the group he led gained board 
representation.43
 Other examples, many involving household names, abound. Targets of corporate 
governance activism thus include McDonalds, where Pershing Square has sought a spin-
off of its real estate assets;44 Wendy’s, where Trian Partners has sought an asset spin-off 
and board seats;45 Heinz, where Trian has nominated 5 directors to the 12 member 
board;46 Pep Boys Manny, Moe & Jack, where Barington has sought to induce the 
                                                 
37 Tania Padgett, A Proxy Fight is Brewing for Steven Madden, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Dec. 30, 2004, at A45. 
 
38 Barington Capital Group Sends Letter to Outside Directors of Steven Madden Ltd., PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 
13, 2004, http://www.prnewswire.com. 
 
39 Steven Madden, Ltd., and the Barington Capital Group Reach Agreement, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 2, 2005, 
http://prnewswire.com.  
 
40 Susan Pulliam, Once a Lone Wolf, Carl Icahn Goes Hedge-Fund Route, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 2005, at 
A1. 
 
41 Greg Johnson, News in brief, The Daily Deal, March 4, 2005; Patricia Koza, " Kerr pursues revamp," 
The Daily Deal, August 9, 2005. 
 
42 Matthew Karnitschnig, Time Warner, Icahn Reach Accord – Firm to Step Up Buybacks, Cost Cutting as 
Investor Ends Bid for Board Seats, Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 2006, at A3. 
 
43  See supra note 6. 
 
44 See supra note 2. 
 
45 James Politi, Wendy’s Agrees with Trian, Fin. Times, Mar. 3., 2006, at 15.  
 
46 Janet Adamy, Heinz Investors to Seek Board Seats, Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 2006, at A17 . 
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company to sell itself or replace its CEO;47 and Delphi Corp., where Appaloosa 
Management has sought board seats and the creation of (and representation on) and 
official equity committee to represent shareholder interests in the company’s Chapter 11 
proceeding. 48
 
 In the course of their general corporate governance activities, hedge funds often 
get involved in various legal disputes with the targets of their activism.  While these 
disputes are usually an adjunct to broader activism – as when Jana Partners sued 
SourceCorp. to invalidate changes in the company’s by-law in light of an impending 
proxy contest49 or when Mason Capital tried to block the recapitalization of Kaman 
arguing that it violated the Connecticut anti-takeover statute50 -- litigation is sometimes 
an essential part of the activist strategy.  Take, for example, Cardinal Value Equity 
Partners, which owned about 1.5 million shares in Hollinger International.  When 
allegations about self-dealing and other improper transactions by Conrad Black, 
Hollinger’s CEO, and other members of Hollinger’s management started to circulate, 
Cardinal brought a lawsuit in Delaware to obtain records and corporate documents.51   
Six months later, in December of 2003, Cardinal brought a derivative lawsuit for breach 
of fiduciary duty against Hollinger’s board of directors.52  Cardinal’s action was stayed to 
permit an independent board company to investigate the alleged misconduct.53  By May 
of 2005, Cardinal had negotiated a $50 million settlement with the directors not directly 
implicated in the self-dealing, with Hollinger pursuing the self-dealing claims against 
                                                 
47 Suzanne McGee, US Shareholder Friendly Rankings, Institutional Investor Magazine, Apr. 14, 2006. 
 
48 Jeffrey McCracken, Delphi Ripped for Bankruptcy Case, Mar. 17, 2006 at A10; see also Karen 
Richardson, New Way to Play Distressed Firms: Acquire the Stock, Wall St. J., May 1, 2006, at 
C1.(reporting that Xerion Capital helped form a equity committee in chapter 11 which succeeded in 
increasing the sale price of Riverstone Networks’s assets from $170 to $210 million). For other instances of 
hedge fund governance activism, see Alan Murray, Backlash Against CEOs Could Go Too Far, WALL ST. 
J., June 15, 2005, at A2 (noting that hedge funds ratcheted up pressure on Morgan Stanley board to remove 
CEO); Henny Sender, Hedge Funds:  The New Corporate Activists, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2005, at C1 
(noting hedge fund activism at OfficeMax, Woolworths, and Wendy’s); Knight Ridder Goes Up for Sale, 
But a Bidding Was in Unlikely, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 2005, at A3 (noting that Knight Ridder, under 
pressure from Private Capital Management, a hedge fund and the company’s largest shareholder, put itself 
up for sale);. Steel Partners Asks Board of BKF Capital to Redeem Poison Pill, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 16, 
2004, http://www.prnewswire.com (discussing activism by Steel partners in BKF); Steel Partners Serves 
Notice to BKF Capital Group, Inc, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14, 2005, http://www.prnewswire.com (same). 
 
49 Jana Partners Sues Sourcecorp, Dallas Business Journal , July 6, 2005. 
 
50 Judge Rules in Favor of Kaman's Proposed Recapitalization; Enjoins Closing Until December 1, PR 
Newswire, Oct. 31, 2005; Kaman and Mason Agree to End Litigation Concerning Recapitalization, PR 
Newswire, Nov. 3, 2005.  
 
51 Liz Vaughan-Adams, The Independent, July 9. 2003 at 19. 
 
52 Jim Kirk, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 3, 2004, at C1 (lawsuit filed on December 10, 2003). 
 
53 Dominic Rushe, Sunday Times, Jan. 4, 2004, at 1. 
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Black and some of his associates in a separate litigation.54  Cardinal, moreover, keeps 
pressuring Hollinger’s board and recently criticized its failure to remove some of the 
settling directors from its ranks.55   
 
 Tellingly, hedge funds have even sought appointment as lead plaintiffs in 
securities fraud class actions under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.  What 
makes these efforts noteworthy is that, even though hedge funds are often among the 
investors with the largest losses, their appointment as a lead plaintiff is fraught with 
problems.  Because hedge funds often engage in short selling, they face issues of reliance 
that may render them “inadequate” class representatives. A short strategy is based on the 
assumption that the current market price is inaccurate. This provides evidence that a 
short-selling hedge fund did not rely on the integrity of the market price, as required 
under the fraud on the market theory on which most securities fraud class actions are 
based.  Indeed, courts have often,56 though not uniformly, 57 rejected the appointment of 
hedge funds as lead plaintiff on that basis.58
 
 2. Corporate Control Activism 
 
 Hedge funds have been particularly active in transactions involving potential 
changes in corporate control.  This activism broadly falls into three categories.  First, as 
shareholders of the acquirer or a proposed corporate control transaction, hedge funds 
                                                 
54 Hollinger Int’l. Announces Settlement by Certain of its Current and Former Independent Directors of 
Claims asserted in Derivative Action Filed by Cardinal Value Equity Partners, L.P., Canada NewsWire, 
May 3, 2005. 
 
55 Richard Siklos, Rebuked, Even Sued, a Board Remains in Place, N.Y. Times,, Sep. 26, 2005, at C1.  See 
also Cardinal Value Sues InfoUSA CEO, Yahoo! Finance, Feb. 24, 2006; In re Pure Resources Shareholder 
Litigation, 2002 Del. Ch. Lexis 116 (other cases where Cardinal engaged in litigation). 
 
56 In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (court rejected a hedge 
fund as lead plaintiff who "engaged in extensive daytrading, first shorting Bank One stock, presumably 
because it was regarded as overvalued at market price, and then buying to cover the short position."): 
Camden Asset Management, L.P., et al. v. Sunbeam Corp., et al., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11022 (S.D. Fla. 
2001) (class action brought by hedge fund that hedged its investment in convertible debentures not certified 
because individual issues of reliance held to predominate); In re Critical Path, Inc., Securities Litigation, 
156 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D.Calif. 2001) (hedge fund which shorted stock held to be inadequate class 
representative in fraud on the market class action because short strategy is premised on inaccuracy of 
current market price). 
 
57 In re Tyson Foods, Inc., Securities Litigation, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17904 (D.Del. 2003) (hedge funds 
held to be adequate class representatives in securities fraud class action); Danis v. USN Communications, 
Inc., 189 F.R.D. 391, 396 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (rejecting challenge to class representative's typicality based on 
short sales, because class representative also lost money on long positions; acknowledging that short selling 
may be inconsistent with fraud-on-the market theory) 
 
58 In an interesting development, Chancellor Leo Strine forced a hedge fund to serve as a defendant class 
representative in Regal Entertainment Group v. Amaranth, LLC, 894 A.2d 1104 (Del. Ch. 2006).  The 
effect of this – and presumably why the hedge fund resisted – is that any settlement must be approved by 
the court and, moreover, as class representative cannot settle separately. 
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have tried to prevent the consummation of the transaction. Second, as shareholders of the 
target of a proposed control transaction, hedge funds have tried to block the deal or 
improve the terms for target shareholders. Third, hedge funds have themselves – 
sometimes on their own, sometimes as part of a group – tried to acquire companies. 
 
 a.  Blocking Acquirers 
 
Perhaps the best-known example of a hedge fund blocking an acquirer involves 
the proposed acquisition by Deutsche Boerse (DB) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  
Having tried and failed to acquire LSE in 2000, DB announced a new acquisition bid in 
December 2004.59  This quickly spurred Euronext, a competing exchange, to announce its 
interest in LSE.60
 
DB’s problems started when, in mid-January, The Children’s Investment Fund 
Management (TCI),61 a London-based hedge fund which had assembled more than a 5% 
stake, announced its opposition.  TCI argued that using DB’s cash hoard to buy back 
shares “would be far superior in value creation.”62  Although the bid did not require 
shareholder approval, TCI held a large enough stake to call an extraordinary general 
meeting to dismiss DB’s supervisory board.63  Around the same time, Atticus Capital, a 
US-based fund which then controlled around 2% of DB’s shares, joined TCI in opposing 
the bid.64 Prompted by TCI and Atticus, by February, DB shareholders holding about 
35% of its stock (including several mutual funds) were planning to confront DB.65  TCI 
started looking for a candidate to replace Rolf Breuer as DB’s chairman, and came up 
                                                 
59 Norma Cohen, Jeremy Grant & Patrick Jenkins, LSE in the Bid Spotlight, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 
Dec. 14, 2004, at 23. 
 
60 Norma Cohen, LSE War Looms as Euronext Confirms Intent, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Dec. 21, 
2004, at 22. 
 
61 So named because half of TCI’s annual management fee of 1 percent is paid to The Children’s 
Investment Fund Foundation.  Martin Waller, Fund Says Opposition to Borse’s LSE Bid is Mounting, 
TIMES (London), Jan. 18, 2005, at 43. 
 
62 Richard Wray, Borse Rebel Threatens to Derail LSE Bid: Investor’s Call for Return of Cash May Block 
German Move, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 17, 2005, at 21. 
 
63 To call a meeting, TCI would have to register its share with BaFin and hold them for 3 months. Damian 
Reece, Borse Could Bid Pounds 1.7 bn for LSE, Says Deutsche, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 27, 2005, at 
48. 
 
64 Norma Cohen, Deutsche Borse’s ‘Empire Building’, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Jan. 17, 2005, at 19.  
 
65 Louise Armitstead, Shareholders Revolt in Bid to Topple Seifert, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 20, 
2005, at Business 1; Julia Kollewe, Fidelity Joins D Borse Shareholder Revolt, INDEPENDENT (London), 
Feb. 25, 2005, at 37 (indicating that Fidelity held more than a 4.5 percent stake). 
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with Lord Jacob Rothschild, who, as it happens, is the father of one of the Atticus 
partners.66
 
In early March, DB’s CEO Seifert came to London to meet with the largest 
dissident shareholders.  They refused.67  With more than 40 or 50% or even 60% of the 
shares opposing the bid, depending on reports, DB abandoned its bid in early March and 
promised to develop a plan to distribute the cash.68  In celebrating the victory, the 
division of labor between hedge funds and traditional institutional investors became clear, 
“One institution said: ‘The hedge funds have done a marvelous job. No matter how we 
feel about companies, traditional managers simply cannot move as fast to achieve our 
aims. We were right behind (the hedge funds), but we couldn't have done it without 
them.’”69  In May 2005, Seifert resigned after having been ordered by the supervisory 
board “to change the composition of both the supervisory and executive boards in order 
to reflect the new ownership structure of the company.”70    
 
Other instances where hedge funds as shareholders of acquirers have sought to 
block an acquisition include Carl Icahn’s efforts to prevent Mylan Laboratories from 
acquiring King Pharmaceuticals;71 Knight Vinke, which followed Templeton is opposing 
VNU’s proposed acquisition of IMS Health;72 Duquesne Capital Management, which 
opposed the proposed acquisition of Public Service Enterprise Group by Exelon;73 
OrbiMed Advisors, which succeeded in blocking the acquisition of EOS by 
Pharmacopia;74 and Pirate Capital, Omega Advisors, and Jana Partners, who oppose 
Mirant’s offer to acquire NRG.75
 
                                                 
66 Louise Armitstead, Rothschild to Lead Battle for Borse Rebels, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 27, 2005, 
at Business 1; Grant Ringshaw, Rothschilds Unite in Attack on Seifert, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 
27, 2005 at City 1. 
 
67 Deutsche Boerse Bows to the might of Investment Funds,  FT Global Newswire, Mar. 7, 2005.  
 
68 Id.; Norma Cohen & Patrick Jenkins, Shareholder Rebellion Puts Paid to Borse Chief’s Vision, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Mar. 7, 2005, at 30; Danny Fortson, Deutsche Borse Drops LSE Hunt, DAILY 
DEAL, Mar. 8, 2005, http://www.thedeal.com.   
 
69 Louise Armitstead, Saved by the Growing Power of Hedge Funds, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar. 13, 
2005, at Business 14. 
 
70 Werner Seifert Resigns As Deutsche Boerse CEO, Wall St. J., May 9, 2005, Wall St. J., May 9, 2005.  
 
71 See infra Section III.A.3. 
 
72 Dennis K. Berman & Jason Singer, The Buzz: VNU’s Largest Shareholders Deride Plan to Buy IMS 
Health, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 2005, at B3. 
 
73 Exelon Merger Criticized, Chicago Tribune, May 13, 2006. 
 
74 Pharmacopia and Eos Call off Merger, San Francisco Business Times, Jan. 18, 2002. 
 
75 Emma Trincal, Mirant Up on Activist Agitation, The Street.com, June 21, 2006. 
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 b.  Blocking Targets 
 
As shareholders of target companies, hedge funds have actively opposed several 
proposed acquisitions and often succeeded in improving the terms of the transaction.  A 
recent example involves Novartis’ attempt to acquire the 58% of Chiron that it did not 
already own.  Novartis initially offered $40 per share for the Chiron shareholders.  An 
independent committee of Chiron negotiated this price up to $45 per share, a 23% 
premium over Chiron’s pre-offer share price.76  One month after the agreement was 
announced, ValueAct Capital, a hedge fund and the third largest shareholder of Chiron, 
sent a stinging letter to Chiron’s CEO announcing its opposition.  This started a 
shareholder revolt with mutual fund Legg Mason, the second largest shareholder of 
Chiron, joining ValueAct’s opposition and Institutional Shareholder Services 
recommending a vote against the deal.77  To get the transaction through, Novartis had to 
raise its offer to $48 a share,78 increasing the premium from 23% to 32%. 
 
The fate of the Chiron-Novartis deal is not unusual.  Other examples of hedge 
funds opposing acquisitions include Masonite International, where Eminence Capital and 
Greystone Management Investment succeeding in raising the price from C$40.20 to 
C$42.25;79 ShopKo, where Elliott Management derailed a proposed acquisition for $24 a 
share;80 MONY, where Highfields led the opposition to its acquisition by AXA;81 
Molson, where Highfields forced Coors to improve the sale terms;82 VNU, where Knight 
Vinke Asset Management opposes its acquisition by a consortium of private equity 
firms;83  Lexar Media, where Carl Icahn and Elliott Associates oppose the merger with 
Micron; Sears Canada where Pershing Square tried to hold out against a bid by Sears 
(itself a company run by hedge fund manager Eddie Lampert) to freeze-out the minority 
shareholders;84 Titan International, where Jana Partners thwarted its proposed acquisition 
                                                 
76 Novartis Announces Agreement to Acquire Remaining Stake in Chiron, Press Release, Nov. 2, 2005 
  
77  David P. Hamilton, Shareholder Insurrection Infects Novartis’s $5.1 Billion Chiron Bid, Wall St. J., Apr. 
3, 2006, at C3. 
 
78 David P. Hamilton, Novartis Raises Chiron Bid, Virtually Sealing Deal, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 2006, at A2. 
 
79 See Eminence Capital Presents Letter to Masonite Board of Directors, CANADA NEWSWIRE, Jan. 27, 
2005, http://www.newswire.ca; Masonite Shareholders Approve Proposed Acquisition by KKR, CANADA 
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 31, 2005, http://www.newswire.ca. 
 
80 ShopKo Agrees to $29 a Share Offer from Sun Capital, Business Journal of Milwaukee, Oct. 18, 2005. 
 
81 See infra Section III.A.2. 
 
82 Innisfree Presentation, supra note 27. 
 
83 See supra note 16. 
 
84 See supra note 14. 
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by a private equity firm;85 and MCI, which faced a threat of a proxy contest by 
Deephaven Capital to derail its acquisition by Verizon.86   
 
  When hedge funds are dissatisfied with the terms of an acquisition and unable to 
obtain better terms, they have also resorted to litigation.  In particular, hedge funds have 
filed statutory appraisal actions, in which shareholders receive a court-determined fair 
value instead of merger consideration. Take the acquisition of Emerging 
Communications (ECM) by its majority-shareholder Innovative Communications Corp. 
for $10.25 per share.87  Greenlight Capital, a hedge fund, held about 500,000 shares in the 
company. After the acquisition was announced, it increased its stake and sought appraisal 
for 750,300 shares.88  As is common-place in minority freeze-out mergers, a plaintiff’s 
law firm had also filed a fiduciary duty action.89  These actions are often settled for a 
relatively modest recovery (if any).90  But when a settlement providing for no additional 
payments to shareholders but for $100,000 in legal fees was proposed,91 Greenlight, 
which had also acquired litigation rights for over 2 million ECM shares, objected.92  Both 
the appraisal and the fiduciary duty action proceeded to trial, and the court determined 
that the fair value of an ECM share was $38.05.  Greenlight was awarded that amount, 
plus compounded interest, on its appraisal shares and damages of $27.80 per share – the 
difference between the fair value and the merger consideration – in the fiduciary duty 
action.93  
                                                 
85 Titan International, Inc. Announces Termination of Proposed Buyout, Business Wire, Apr. 21, 2006. 
 
86 See Dennis K. Berman & Almar Latour, Major MCI Holder Starts Proxy Fight to Thwart Verizon, WALL 
ST. J., June 15, 2005, at B3 (noting possible proxy fight by Deephaven Capital Management against 
Verizon-MCI merger); see also Jason Singer, With Rising Clout, Hedge Funds Start to Sway Mergers, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2005, at A1 (reporting several instances where hedge funds interfered with 
acquisition bids).   
 
87 In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *3, 2004 WL 1305745, at 
*1 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004, revised June 4, 2004).  
 
88 Greenlight had held shares in ECM before the merger was announced, but increased its stake by 264,700 
shares between the announcement and the merger vote.  In its 13D filed 10 days later, Greenlight disclosed 
that it intends to seek appraisal rights.  See Greenlight Capital, L.L.C., General Statement of Acquisition of 
Beneficial Ownership (Form 13D) (Sept. 28, 1998). 
 
89 In re Emerging Commc’ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70 at *3, 2004 WL 1305745, at *1. 
 
90 See In re Cox Commc’ns, S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 622 (Del. Ch. 2005); Elliott J. Weiss  & 
Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class 
Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1797 (2004). 
 
91 Brickell Partners v. Prosser, Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement, June 27, 2000. 
 
92 In re Emerging Commc’ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70 at *3, 2004 WL 1305745, at *1. 
 
93 In re Emerging Commc’ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70 at *155, 2004 WL 1305745, at *43.  Emerging has 
appealed the judgment to the Delaware Supreme Court where the case is presently pending. See also 
Prescott Group v. The Coleman Co., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131 (awarding dissenting shareholders of 
Coleman who sought appraisal, which included hedge fund, $32 a share).   
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Other instances of hedge funds exercising appraisal rights include Gabelli Asset 
Managements’s 2004 appraisal action against Carter Wallace,94 Prescott Group’s 
appraisal against Coleman,95 and the pending appraisal action brought by Icahn and 
others in Transkaryotic Therapies, where hedge funds had tried but failed to block the 
acquisition and decided to pursue appraisal instead of accepting the merger 
consideration.96   
 
 c. Making Bids 
 
Unlike traditional institutional investors, hedge funds not only urge portfolio 
companies to be acquired by others, but have themselves made attempts to acquire these 
companies.  These bids can be part of a strategy to improve the governance or capital 
structure of these companies or to put the target in play.  In other instances, however, 
hedge funds have emerged as controlling shareholders of large industrial corporations. 
 
As an example of an acquisition offer that induced corporate governance changes, 
consider GenCorp.  GenCorp owned more than 12,000 acres of undeveloped land in 
Sacramento, a holding that attracted the interest of various investors.97  In November, 
2004, Steel Partners (a hedge fund) announced that it was interested in acquiring 
GenCorp for $17 per share.98  When the board rejected Steel Partner’s advance, it 
threatened a proxy contest.99  By February, 2005, GenCorp had entered into an agreement 
according to which Steel Partners would cast its votes in favor of GenCorp’s nominees in 
exchange for which a representative of Steel Partners could attend board meetings; and 
the board would appoint a new independent director expert in corporate governance 
identified in consultation with Steel Partners; and the board would then consider 
corporate governance changes proposed by Steel Partners.100  
 
Next consider ShopKo, a retail and pharmacy store chain.  ShopKo had agreed to 
be acquired by Golder Hawn, a private equity firm, for $24 per share.  But Elliott 
                                                 
94 Press Release, Gabelli Clients Realize a More Than 40% Premium in Settlement of Carter-Wallace 
Appraisal Litigation, Nov. 1, 2004. 
 
95 Prescott Group v. Coleman Co., 2004 Del. Ch. Lexis 131. 
 
96 Latham and Watkins, Hedge Fund Activist M & A Investing, 2006 Proxy Season Symposium (on file 
with authors). 
 
97 Gene G. Marcial, GenCorp’s Earthly Assets, BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2005, at 100. 
 
98 Steel Partners Offers to Acquire the Outstanding Shares of GenCorp Inc. in Letter to Board, PR 
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 11, 2004, http://www.prnewswire.com. 
 
99 Ron Orol, GenCorp Rejects $700M Offer, DAILY DEAL, Nov. 16, 2004, http://www.thedeal.com.  
 
100 Dale Kasler, GenCorp Reaches Truce with Firm that Made Hostile Bid, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 17, 
2005, at D1. 
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Associates, a hedge fund with a major stake in ShopKo, opposed the proposed deal. 
Together with Sun Capital, a private equity firm, and some other investors, Elliott made a 
counter bid of $26.50.  After an auction, the Elliott group succeeded in acquiring ShopKo 
for $29 a share.101
 
Finally, take Kmart.  Kmart had filed for bankruptcy in February 2002.  When it 
emerged from Chapter 11 in May 2003,102  its largest shareholder was the hedge fund 
ESL, run by Edward Lampert.  ESL owned about 50% of the company, having acquired 
$2 billion in financial claims (for somewhere around $200 million) which were then 
converted into stock in the reorganization.103 At the time Kmart emerged from 
bankruptcy, its stock opened at $15 per share and drifted downwards.  But by July 2004, 
Kmart’s stock was at $76 per share and Lampert, who had taken over the management of 
Kmart, was the toast of the town.104  By unlocking the value of Kmart’s real estate 
through selling off stores, Kmart accumulated a $2.2 billion “cash hoard.”105 By 
November 2004, Lampert answered the market’s question of what he was going to do 
with all that money: Kmart and Sears agreed to merge.106  The news of the deal pushed 
Kmart stock up to $109 per share, with Sears shares rising as well.107   
 
Additional examples of hedge funds making bids include Appaloosa 
Management, which made a bid for Beverly Enterprises;108 Highfields, which made a bid 
to acquire Circuit City;109 ValueAct, which is trying to acquire Acxiom, 110 and Jana 
Partners, which made a bid for Houston Exploration.111
                                                 
101 ShopKo Agrees to $29 a Share Offer from Sun Capital, Business Journal of Milwaukee, Oct. 18, 2005. 
 
102 Which is very quick for a major bankruptcy, and explained by the incentives put in place for 
management.  See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Reply, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 673 (2003). 
 
103 Week in Review, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., May 12, 2003, at 34; Christopher Byron, Short-Sell Scramble; 
Investors are Betting That Kmart Won’t Bounce Back, N.Y. POST, May 19, 2003, at 37. 
 
104 Becky Yerak, Exec Lifts Kmart’s Stock into Blue Yonder, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 2004, at C1. 
 
105 Robert Berner, Turning Kmart into a Cash Cow, BUS. WK., July 12, 2004, at 81,. 
 
106 Constance L. Hays, Kmart Takeover of Sears is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004, at A1.  
 
107 Id. ESL had owned a large block of Sears stock since before its investment in Kmart, a block which had 
increased to 15% by the time the merger was announced.  Merger at the Mall; Kmart and Sears Merge, 
ECONOMIST.COM, Nov. 18, 2004, http://www.economist.com. 
 
108 Peter Moreira, Four Funds Bid for Beverly, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 27, 2004, http://www.thedeal.com.  In 
response to the bid, the board of Beverly decided to auction the company, which was ultimately acquired 
by another bidder. Peter Loftus, Beverly Enterprises to be Acquired By Investor Group for $1.63 Billion, 
Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 2005, at A6; Beverly Enterprises Receives Higher Bid, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 2005, at 
C5; Peter Loftus, Beverly Enterprises Agrees to Bid By Fillmore Despite Better Offer, Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 
2005, at C4. 
 
109 Michael Barbaro, Circuit City Rejects Hedge Fund's Cash Bid, Washington Post,  Mar. 8, 2005 at E05; 
Gary McWilliams, Circuit City Rejects Takeover Bid, Won’t Consider Any Other Offers, WALL ST. J., 
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 B. Activism by Traditional Institutions Compared 
 
Over the last 20 years, traditional institutional investors – specifically public 
pension funds and mutual funds – have also engaged in shareholder activism.  The mode 
of this activism, however, differs in important respect from the activism by hedge funds. 
 
Activism by traditional institutions falls for the most part in two categories.  
Starting in the mid-1980s, and continuing to a limited extent until today, traditional 
institutions have made shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8.  These proposals are 
usually precatory resolutions that relate to various aspects of the corporate governance 
rules, such as poison pills, confidential voting, and board structure.  Most of these 
proposals were introduced by a set of public pension funds – including CalPERS, various 
New York pension funds, and the State of Wisconsin Investment Board – and by TIAA-
CREF.112  Since the mid-1990s, institutions have increasingly engaged in private 
negotiations to get boards to make governance changes voluntarily and have resorted to 
formal proposals in some of the instances where boards failed to do so.113    
 
Seeking governance changes through (actual or threatened) shareholder proposals 
has largely been the domain of public pension funds.114 Other than TIAA-CREF, mutual 
funds have not themselves been active in introducing proposals, whether initially or after 
failed private negotiations.  Mutual funds have, however, voted in favor of proposals 
introduced by others.  In addition, mutual funds have adopted policies to vote against 
certain changes in governance rules that entrench the current board if such changes are 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mar. 8, 2005, at A8 (reporting bid by hedge fund Highfields for Circuit City and reporting increasing 
interest by hedge funds in pursuing takeovers). 
 
110 ValueAct Redoubles Acxiom Takeover Effort, Direct, Oct. 4, 2005. 
 
111 Marietta Cauch, Jana Partners Sets Energy Bid in Unusual Move for Hedge Fund, Wall St. J., June 13, 
2006 (reporting bid by Jana for Houston Exploration). 
 
112 See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder 
Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. Fin. 275 (2000) (presenting data of proposals); Diane 
Del Guercio & Jennifer Hawkins, The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism, 52 J. Fin. Econ. 
293 (1999) (same); Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from 
CalPERS, 51 J. Fin. 227 (1996) (same); Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Corporate Governance and Shareholder 
Initiatives: Empirical Evidence, 42 J. Fin. Econ. 365 (1996) (same). 
 
113 Carleton et al., The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: 
Evidence from TIAA-CREF, 53 J. Fin. 1335 (1998); Gillen & Starks, supra note 112, at 279; Stuart L. 
Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional 
Investors: A Global Perspective,  J. Appl. Corp. Fin. 4, 10, Fall/Winter 2003. 
 
114 More recently, union-affiliated pension funds increasingly sponsor shareholder proposals. 
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proposed by the board of directors and sometimes withhold votes (i.e., abstain) in the 
election of directors.115
 
These activities differ from activism by hedge funds in a variety of ways.  They 
are directed to changes in the corporate governance rules, rather than to specific aspects 
of a company’s business or management (such as share buy-backs, spin-offs, mergers, or 
the composition of the board of directors). The effect of the policy changes sought is 
usually minor, either because the subject matter is not very important,116 because the 
shareholder resolution is precatory (and a favorable vote is thus not binding), or because 
a board, even if it agrees to adopt the proposed policy, is free to change it at a later point 
of time. To the extent that the “activism” takes the form of merely voting in favor of 
proposals by others (or against proposals made by the company’s board), it represent a 
rather passive form of “activism.”  Finally, a group of portfolio companies tend to be 
targeted at the same time117 and often with respect to the same governance changes.  
Viewed charitably, this mode of activism is designed to achieve small changes in 
multiple companies at little expense, but is unlikely to result in big changes in specific 
companies.  The prominent role of proxy advisory firms like Institutional Shareholders 
Services (ISS) is consistent with this focus on small, low cost, systemic changes. 
 
The second category of activities by traditional institutions consists of “behind the 
scenes” discussions with company management and board members.118  From what has 
become known about these activities after the fact, it appears that they seek the same 
modest changes in governance rules as do shareholder proposals.  For example, Carleton, 
Nelson and Weisbach, who obtained access to the private correspondence between 
TIAA-CREF and firms, report that the changes sought involved confidential voting, 
board diversity, and limitations on targeted stock placements.119  Known instances of 
institutions seeking more far reaching changes are rare and often involve unusual fact 
patterns.120   
                                                 
115 See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 Colum. 
L. Rev. 795, 834 (1993).  Public pension funds, though not mutual funds, have also applied to become lead 
plaintiff in securities fraud class actions.  Securities fraud class actions, however, are at the periphery of 
corporate governance and control activities. 
 
116 Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Voting Matter?, 32 J. Legal Stud. 465 (2003)(concluding that 
confidential voting proposals are immaterial). 
 
117 See Press Release, CalPERS Focus List Targets Six Underperfroming Companies, Apr. 19, 2006. 
 
118 Carleton, supra note 113, Gillan & Starks, supra note 113, at 10. 
 
119 Carleton et al., supra note 113, at 1343 – 48; see also Allen Myerson, The New Activism at Fidelity, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1993, at 15 (noting letter opposing certain pay plans that Fidelity sent to 100 
companies).   See also Alan Murphy, At AIG, a First Glance at ‘Good Governance’, Wall St. J., May 17, 
2006, at A2 (noting that public pension funds induced governance changes such as separating the posts of 
chairman and CEO, increasing the number of independent board members, and requiring independent 
directors to meet in ‘executive session’). 
 
120 Gillan and Starks, for example, report that Fidelity had one of its employees appointed as CEO of Colt 
Telecom.  Gillan & Starks, supra, note 113. But Colt was unusual in that it was founded by Fidelity, was 
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As to the activities that have remained non-public, we of course do not know their 
full scale and scope.  But we consider it unlikely that such activities resemble the 
activism of hedge funds.  That institutions often succeed in achieving major changes 
through behind the scenes discussions without their efforts to do so sometimes becoming 
public is implausible.121 After all, if management is not receptive to the proposed 
changes, the institution must either give up or go public.  And if management knows that 
institutions are reluctant to go public, they have little incentive to accede to the request 
for change.  Moreover, the leverage that institutions can exercise behind the scenes is 
limited.  If an institution wanted to coordinate its pressure with those of other institutions, 
it may become engaged in a solicitation or in the formation of a “group,” which would 
often require a public filing.122  The scarcity of such filings and the absence of any 
reports to the contrary, suggest that traditional institutions do not coordinate their “behind 
the scenes” pressure.  We are skeptical whether uncoordinated pressure by a single 
institution will often result in meaningful change. 
 
This being said, traditional institutions have recently, in the wake of hedge fund 
activism, become somewhat more active in matters involving corporate control.  Thus, as 
discussed above, Franklin Mutual Advisers, an investment adviser for mutual funds and 
other accounts, has joined forces with a hedge fund and other investors in making a bid 
for Beverly Enterprises; and mutual funds have supported the efforts of hedge funds to 
block the acquisition of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Bank, of Chiron by 
Novartis, of MONY by AXA, and of IMS Health by VNU.123  And we suspect that here 
are additional examples where traditional institutions have expressed support for hedge 
funds in private communications with management.  Hedge funds, it thus appears, have 
not just been activist themselves; they have also been a catalyst for activism by traditional 
institutions conducted jointly with, or in the wake of, hedge funds.124   
                                                                                                                                                 
close to bankruptcy , and Fidelily held 54% of its stock.  See Colt Names Fidelity’s Akin to Replace CEO 
Maning, Boston Bus. J., July 24, 2002. 
 
121 Cf. Leon Lazaroff, Hedge Fund Activist Turn up Heat, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 27, 2005 (quoting 
investor as saying that mutual funds rarely press underperforming companies to change); Jill Fisch, 
Relationship Investing: Will it Happen? Will it Work?, 55 Ohio St. L. J. 1008, 1030 (1994). 
 
122 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Sections 13(d) and 14(a).  By contrast, hedge funds, by 
conducting their activism in public, reduce the need for express coordination.  See also Section III.B.1. 
 
123 This kind of activism is relatively novel for mutual funds. See Ann Carrns, Putnam Cites Price in Plan to 
Vote Against WaMu’s Providian Deal, Wall St. J., Aug. 2. 2005, at C3 (quoting bank analyst as describing 
public opposition by a mutual fund to acquisition as “a little bit unusual”). 
 
124 See generally Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Shareholder Activism in the M&A Context, Client 
memo, May 15, 2006 (“even traditional long-term institutional investors are on occasion becoming more 
outspoken than they have in the past. The fusion of aggressive hedge fund activism and the power of large 
institutional holders is a potent formula that can energize an activist campaign.”).  The willingness of 
traditional institutions to become involved in activism with hedge funds may be enhanced by the adoption 
of Reg. FD, which made it harder for management to retaliate against institutional investors by engaging in 
selective disclosure of information.  Black, supra note 25, at 601. 
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 C. Hedge Fund Activism in Perspective 
 
In assessing the many instances where hedge funds have adopted an activist 
posture in corporate governance and control transactions, one has to keep in mind that 
only a minority of hedge funds pursue shareholder activism.  Some hedge funds do not 
own many equity securities because they pursue macroeconomic strategies or because 
they invest primarily in debt securities.  And even most hedge funds that focus on equity 
securities are not activist – because they pursue quantitative strategies, because they 
value their relationship with management, or for other reasons.125  Indeed, according to a 
recent estimate by J.P. Morgan, only 5% of hedge fund assets, or about $50 billion, are 
available for shareholder activism.126  
 
Our point in discussing hedge fund activism is thus not that shareholder activism 
is predominant among hedge funds.  It is not.  Our point is rather that hedge funds – to 
the virtual exclusion of traditional institutional investors -- dominate certain modes of 
shareholder activism.  The fact that only a minority of hedge funds engage in such 
activism makes this point, if anything, even more noteworthy. 
 
But the fact that, at present, only a minority of hedge funds are engaged in 
shareholder activism is important for another reason as well.  It indicates that there is a 
large untapped fund of money that could quickly become available for activism.  If 
activist strategies are profitable, and more so than the other investment strategies hedge 
funds pursue, it would not take much for the capital devoted to activism to double or even 
quadruple overnight.127  Thus, whatever the extent of hedge fund activism today, it can 
become much larger – or much smaller – tomorrow. 
 
 
 II.  Hedge Funds as Institutional Investors 
 
The activities of hedge funds described in Part I give substance to the hope that 
hedge funds may act “like real owners” and provide a check on management discretion.  
But similar hopes were generated in the 1980s when commentators noted that a 
significant shift in the shareholder profile of public corporations -- from small individual 
                                                 
125 See, e.g., Richard Dobbs & Timothy Koller, Inside a Hedge Fund: An interview with the Managing 
Partner of Maverick Capital, McKinsey on Finance 6, 9-10, Spring 2006 (explaining that hedge fund avoids 
public disputes with management and will sell stock if board does not respond to suggestions for change).  
See generally The Barclay Group, Hedge Fund Industry – Assets Under Management, at 
www.barclaygrp.com/indices/ghs/HF_Money_Under_Management.html (chart of money under 
management by hedge fund strategy).   
 
126 J.P.Morgan, Global Mergers and Acquisitions Review, at 89. 
 
127 Unlike mutual funds, which have to abide by the investment policies described in their registration 
statement or obtain shareholder approval for a change (see Investment Company Act, sec. 8(b)(2)), hedge 
funds can quickly change their policies to respond to new profit opportunities. 
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shareholders to large institutional holders -- had taken place.128  The rise of institutional 
investors generated, starting in the early 1990s, a series of articles analyzing the corporate 
governance implications of institutional shareholdings.129
 
In this Part, we analyze hedge funds against the backdrop of the analysis of 
traditional institutional investors.  Our comparison will focus on open-ended mutual 
funds, both because mutual funds are the most important institutional investor, holding 
about 23% of all corporate equities;130 and because they are economically closest to 
hedge funds.  But we will also discuss, more briefly, public pension funds, the second 
largest category of traditional institutions, which hold 9.6% of corporate equities.131  
 
 A. Mutual Funds and Monitoring 
 
  1. The Plus:  Size & Expertise 
 
Compared to individual investors, mutual funds enjoy a major advantage as 
corporate monitors:  they are large.  The average size of an equity mutual fund was $218 
million in 1990 and $960 million in 2004.132  The largest mutual funds manage assets in 
the tens of billions of dollars.133  In comparison, the average capitalization of stocks in 
the S&P 500 Index is $22 billion and of stocks in the S&P MidCap Index is $2.7 billion. 
 
Due to their size, mutual funds enjoy significant economies of scale.  These 
economies of scale arise in two ways.  For one, they will tend to own a greater number of 
shares of an individual company than individual investors do.  To the extent that 
governance activities entail company-specific costs, these costs can be spread over a 
larger investment.  Moreover, mutual funds will tend to own shares in a larger number of 
companies than individual investors do. To the extent that governance activities entail 
                                                 
128 According to the Federal Reserve Board, the percentage ownership of corporate equities by households 
declined from 88% in 195 to 59% in 1980, while ownership by pension funds and mutual funds increased 
from 4% to 21%.  This trend has continued, with the ownership by households declining to 33% and one 
ownership by pension and mutual funds increasing to 42%. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Flow of Funds Accounts of the U.S., table L.213, various years [hereinafter Flow of Funds Accounts].  
 
129  See generally Black, supra note 25; Rock, supra note 25. 
 
130 According to the Flow of Funds accounts, supra note 128, mutual funds in 2005 held $4174 of $18199 
billion (23%) of corporate equities.   
 
131 Flow of Funds Accounts, supra note 128.  Private pension funds held another 9.4% of corporate equities.  
Id.  We do not further discuss corporate pension funds both they hold fewer assets than mutual fund, 
because the literature on institutional investors has expressed skepticism about whether corporate funds will 
be activist, and because corporate funds, unlike public funds, have not been activist. 
 
132 Investment Company Institute, 2005 Investment Company Fact Book (2005), tables 3 and 5. 
 
133 For example, Vanguard’s S&P 500 Index funds has assets of $107 billion.  See 
http://flagship2.vanguard.com/VGApp/hnw/FundsHoldings?FundId=0040&FundIntExt=INT (last visited 
on July 19, 2006). 
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costs that are common for several companies, these costs can be spread over a larger 
number of investments. 
 
2. The Minuses: Regulation, Incentive Problems and 
Conflicts 
 
But mutual funds also suffer from a number of disadvantages that impede their 
ability to act as effective monitors.  These disadvantages fall into three categories: 
regulatory constraints, inadequate incentives, and conflicts of interests.134
 
  a. Regulatory Constraints 
 
Mutual funds are subject to a number of regulatory constraints that can affect their 
ability and incentives to monitor portfolio companies.  For one, mutual funds are subject 
to special disclosure requirements not applicable to other types of investors.  Specifically, 
mutual funds must file a semi-annual list showing the amounts and values of the 
securities they own.135  This makes it harder for mutual funds to accumulate positions in 
portfolio companies without such companies, and the market at large, becoming aware of 
their activities.   
 
In addition, in order to qualify for significant tax benefits, mutual funds must 
comply with the diversification requirements in subchapter M of the Internal Revenue 
Code.  Accordingly, 50% of the assets of a mutual are subject to the limitation that the 
fund may own no more than 10% of the outstanding securities of a portfolio company 
and that the stock of any portfolio company may not constitute more than 5% of the value 
of the assets of the fund.   Moreover, in order to advertise themselves as “diversified,” – 
the preferred mode for most funds136 -- funds must satisfy as well the diversification 
requirements of the Investment Company Act.  Under the Act, 75% of the assets of a 
mutual fund are subject to the above limitation that the fund may own no more than 10% 
of the outstanding securities of a portfolio company and that the stock of any portfolio 
company may not constitute more than 5% of the value of the assets of the fund.  These 
diversification requirements, in principle, limit the ability of funds to take large positions 
in a single company, though the constraints they pose may not be binding for larger 
mutual funds. 
 
Open end mutual funds, by definition and by statute, must also stand ready to 
redeem their shares at the request of any shareholder at short notice.137  The redemption 
                                                 
134 See generally Black, supra note 25; Rock, supra note 25. 
 
135 Investment Company Act, Section 30(e)(2). In addition, under recently passed legislation, mutual funds 
must disclose how they voted any shares of their portfolio companies.  Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies 
and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 
2003).  
 
136 Roe, supra note 25, at 1474. 
 
137 15 U.S.C. §80a-5(2005). 
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price of these shares is based on the fund’s net asset value.  There requirements make it 
difficult for mutual funds to have illiquid investments: illiquid investments cannot be 
readily transformed into cash when fund shareholders want to redeem their shares and 
cannot be easily valued.  The staff of the SEC therefore issued a guideline limiting the 
aggregate holdings of a mutual fund in illiquid investments to no more than 15% of the 
fund’s net assets.138  
 
Last not least, regulations make it difficult for mutual funds to base the fee paid to 
the fund management company on the performance of the fund. Performance fees must 
be symmetrical, such that if fees are higher than normal after a good year, they must be 
lower than normal after a bad year.139  But even symmetrical pay-for-performance fees 
are rendered impracticable by the requirement that performance fees be based on a period 
of at least one year.  Thus, if a fund has a stellar performance in one month, fund 
managers will earn an increased performance fee for the following 11 months. This, of 
course, creates incentives for investors to sell their shares at the end of the first month, 
when they have fully benefited from the stellar performance in that month but only paid 
1/12 of the associated performance fee, and discourages investors from buying shares in a 
fund, when they have to pay 11/12 of the performance fee without getting the benefits of 
the stellar performance.  
 
  b. Incentives to Monitor 
 
Activism of the variety described in Part I is not cheap.  Fund managers first have 
to identify a company that would benefit from activism and develop a strategy for the 
company that would raise its share price.  Then fund mangers have to pressure the 
company’s management to adopt that strategy.  All of this consumes a lot of time for the 
fund manager and entails significant costs for performing in-house analysis and hiring 
outside advisors. 
 
For mutual funds, the incentives to expend resources on such activism are 
limited.140   The lack of incentives is most pronounced for managers of indexed funds.  
The job of index fund managers is to replicate the performance of the index.  An index 
fund thus competes with other funds replicating the same index principally on the basis of 
fund expenses.  As activism is costly and thus raises the funds’ expenses (or lowers the 
managing company’s profits), index fund managers will be reluctant to engage in 
activism. 
 
A similar shortage of incentives is often present for diversified mutual funds.  As 
discussed before, regulatory barriers make it difficult for mutual funds to charge 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
138 Tamar Frankel, The Regulation of Money Managers, vol. 3 at 236 (Little Brown, 1980) (recommending 
10% limit); Supplement at 83 (noting increase to 15%). 
 
139 Investment Advisers Act, Section 205. Hedge fund advisors are exempt by subsection (c)(7). 
 
140 Rock, supra note 25, at 472. 
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performance-based fees. As a result, 97% of all funds, accounting for 92% of all mutual 
fund assets, charge fees based on a flat percentage of the fund’s assets under 
management.141   Asset-based fees, however, provide only small direct incentives to 
engage in costly activism.  The median stock fund in 2004 charged investors total 
expenses of 1.45% of assets, of which about half were management fees.142  Thus, for 
example, when a manager of a $1 billion mutual fund earns additional profits of $100 
million (a 10% return), total annual fees increase by $1.45 million and management fee 
increase by $750,000.  Of course, a portion of these increased fees cover increased 
expenses associated with running a larger fund and fees do not increase at all to the extent 
that investors withdraw some of the profits.  To get a sense of how much a fund 
management company benefits from the increased profits, assume that $1 million of the 
$1.45 million in total increased fees constitute profits for the fund managers and that 
investors keep any profits in the fund for three years before they withdraw them.  
Applying a 5% discount rate, the $100 million in fund profits would then generate $2.85 
million in additional profits for the fund management company – equivalent to very 
modest implicit performance fee of 2.85%. Even this rough estimate probably overstates 
the implicit performance fees as most larger funds utilize “breakpoints,” where the 
marginal percentage fee declines as fund assets increase.143  
 
Even for the few funds that charge explicit performance fees, incentives are not 
much stronger.  The reason is that, in order to avoid the problem of strategic timing of 
withdrawals and contributions described above, performance-fees in mutual funds are 
relatively flat even when they exist.  Fidelity’s Magellan fund for example, charges a 
performance adjustment of 0.02% of assets for each percentage point of outperformance 
or underperformance relative to the S&P 500 Index, up to a maximum of plus or minus 
.2%.  This is the equivalent of an annual performance fee of 2% of the fund’s profits (as 
long as the profits are within the range where the performance adjustment is made).144
 
Mutual funds, of course, can also benefit from good performance indirectly.  
Studies have shown that funds that outperform their peers generally attract inflows of 
new assets.145 A recent study by Stephen Choi and one of us, for example, finds that a 1% 
abnormal positive performance by a fund (relative to other funds with the same 
investment objective) is associated with increased inflows of roughly 1% over the 
following year, while a 1% abnormal negative performance is associated with outflows of 
                                                 
141 Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short: Pay-for-Performance Bedevils Mutual Funds, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 2005, 
at C 1. 
 
142 See More Funds Lower Fees after Scandal in 2003,  USA Today,  Dec. 12, 2005.  Testimony of Jeffrey 
C. Keil, Lipper Inc., Jan. 27, 2004 [hereinafter Lipper  testimony]. 
 
143 Lipper testimony, supra note 142, at 15. 
 
144 Prospectus, Fidelity Magellan Fund, May 30, 2006. 
 
145 See, e.g., Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, Working Paper 
(2006); Richard A. Ippolito, Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality: Evidence from the Mutual 
Fund Industry, 35 Journal of Law and Economics 45 (1992).   
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about .6% over a year.  Increased inflows, of course, generate management and other 
asset-based fees.  The implicit performance fee generated indirectly by the effect of 
positive performance on inflows is thus roughly of the same magnitude as the implicit 
performance fee generated directly by asset-based fees. 
 
In one important respect, however, the incentive effect of performance on net 
assets via inflows differs from the incentive effect of performance on net assets via 
profits.   While the latter is a function of the funds absolute performance, the former turns 
on a fund’s performance relative to other funds with similar investment objectives.146  
Activism, however, will increase a fund’s relative returns only to the extent that the fund 
has a higher stake in the portfolio company (relative to the fund size) than competing 
funds do and the costs of activism to the fund is less than that differential.  For any given 
portfolio company, this means that funds with a below average stake in the company 
(relative to fund size) have no incentives – or indeed negative incentives – to take action 
to increase that company’s value, and funds with an above average stake have only 
attenuated incentives to expend resources on activism.147
 
For example, Table 1 below lists the 10 largest stock holdings as of March 31, 
2005 of the Fidelity Magellan Fund and the comparable holdings in these companies (as 
of 12/31/04) of the Vanguard 500 Index Fund.  
 
Table 1: Top 10 Magellan Holdings Relative to S&P 500 Index 
 
Company Magellan 
Investment 
 (in %) 
Vanguard 
500 Index  
(in %) 
Difference Dilution of 
Magellan’s 
Incentives 
GE 4.1 3.4 .7 83% 
Microsoft 3.0 2.6 .4 87% 
Exxon Mobil 3.0 2.9 .1 97% 
Citigroup 2.7 2.2 .5 81% 
AIG 2.7 1.5 1.2 56% 
Home Depot 2.2 0.8 1.4 36% 
Bank of America 2.2 1.7 .5 77% 
Viacom 2.1 0.5 1.6 24% 
Pfizer 2.0 1.8 .2 90% 
Tyco Int’l 1.9 0.6 1.3 32% 
All 10 stocks 25.9% 18% 7.9 69% (weighted) 
 
The last column of the table indicates the degree to which the Magellan Fund’s incentives 
to monitor are diluted by the fact that any increase in the value of these shares would not 
improve the fund’s performance relative to the S&P 500 index.  As the table shows, the 
                                                 
146 Fisch, supra note 121, at 1020. 
 
147 See Rock, supra note 25, at 473. And even funds with an above average stake relative to fund size have 
incentives to expend material resources only if the stake is significant in absolute terms. 
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degree of dilution is significant even for the largest holdings of the fund.  For smaller 
holdings, the degree of dilution is likely to be even higher.148  
 
  c. Conflicts of Interest 
 
Mutual funds also suffer from conflicts of interests between fund managers and 
fund beneficiaries which inhibit their activities as monitors of portfolio companies.149 
Many mutual fund management companies are affiliated with – in effect subsidiaries of 
and controlled by – another financial institution, such as an investment bank or an 
insurance company.  For example, of the 20 largest mutual fund complexes in 2003, nine 
had such affiliations.150 Managers in such funds may be reluctant to antagonize present or 
future clients of their parent company with their governance activities.  Indeed, the effect 
of such affiliations on governance activism may be both more subtle and more pervasive.  
Consider, for example a mutual fund affiliated with an investment bank.  The mutual 
fund managers will, ex ante, often not know which portfolio companies have hired, or are 
about to hire, the investment bank as underwriter or financial advisor.  And, ex post, the 
investment banker would, for PR and legal reasons,151 not want to interfere directly with 
the governance activism of the mutual fund when an investment banking client becomes 
the target of such activism.  Thus, the easiest and safest way to avoid any problems is for 
affiliated mutual funds not to engage in governance activism at all.  This way, mutual 
fund managers do not have to distinguish between portfolio companies that are 
investment banking clients and those that are not, and investment bankers do not have to 
                                                 
148 For example, for the 10 companies in the Magellan Fund’s “Consumer Staples” industry group, which 
account for 7.9% of the fund assets, the weighted average dilution is 78%.  As further discussed below, the 
degree of dilution in incentives is endogenous as it is a function of a fund’s investment portfolio which 
itself will be a function of the fund’s desire to engage in activism.  See infra Section II.C.5.  For purposes 
of this section, however, we took a fund’s portfolio as given to determine the incentive to engage in 
activism given the portfolio choice. 
 
149 See Rock, supra note 25, at 469; Black, supra note 25, at 601. John C. Bogle, Individual Stockholder, 
R.I.P., Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 2005, at A16 (noting conflicts by mutual fund managers when a proxy proposal is 
opposed by management and conspicuous absence of corporate governance activism). Conflicts are 
regarded as particularly pronounced in defined benefit plans, where fund assets are usually managed by 
designated corporate pension fund managers. The managers of a corporate pension fund are appointed by 
the executives of the corporation that sponsors the pension plan.  These executives are believed to pressure 
pension fund managers to cast pro-management votes.  Accordingly, corporate pension funds have not been 
regarded as likely to become active, and have not become active, in corporate governance.  Black, supra 
note 25, at 596. 
 
150 The list of funds was derived from Geoffrey H. Bobroff & Thomas H. Mack, Assessing the Significance 
of Mutual Fund Board Independent Chairs, Mar. 10, 2004, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/fidelity031004.httr.   
 
151 The potential pitfalls facing a mutual fund are illustrated by the publicity caused when Deutsche Asset 
management Inc., an affiliate of Deutsche Bank, switched its votes from against to for the merger of 
Hewlett-Packard and Compaq after it learned that Deutsche Bank provided investment banking advice to 
HP.   See SEC, SEC Brings Settled Enforcement Action Against Deutsche Bank Investment Advisory Unit 
in Connection with Its Voting of Client Proxies for Merger Transaction; Imposes $750,000 Penalty (Aug. 
19, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-100.htm. 
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worry about mutual fund managers who are spoiling their business and need to be 
stopped.152    
 
Of course, many mutual funds companies, including the two largest -- Fidelity 
and Vanguard -- are not affiliated with other financial institutions.  But even unaffiliated 
mutual fund managers, especially the larger ones, face potential conflicts.  For many 
mutual fund complexes, the management of corporate pension plans is an important 
source of revenues.153  Governance activism could lead to a loss of such business, not just 
with respect to the activist fund but for the complex as a whole.154  John Bogle, the 
founder and former head of the Vanguard, even suggested that merely voting against 
management could “jeopardize the retention of clients of 401(k) and pension 
accounts.”155  And Don Phillips, a managing director of Morningstar, attributes the 
reluctance of funds to support shareholder proposals to rein in executive pay to their 
“desire to solicit business from corporations.”156 As in the case of affiliated funds, the 
effect of such conflicts on governance activism may be to deter strong activism on a 
broader scale.  It is certainly easy to imagine that a mutual fund complex could conclude 
that having the reputation as a governance trouble-maker in management circles is not 
conducive to being picked as manager for corporate pension plans, and that the profits to 
be made from managing these pension plans exceed those from governance activism. 
 
To assess the significance of these conflicts of interest, they have to be compared 
to the affirmative incentive a fund would have, absent any conflicts, to engage in 
activism.  As discussed in the previous section, activism is costly and fund management 
companies only profit modestly from any fund profits generated by activism.  Thus, in 
our view, even modest conflicts of interest could easily dissuade a fund management 
company from pursuing an activist strategy and induce it to rely instead on less conflict 
prone strategies – such as quantitative research or fundamental value analysis – to 
generate excess returns. 
 
                                                 
152 Cf. Gerald F. Davis and E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, __ J. Fin. Econ. 
__ (2006) (finding that, given policies, voting by mutual funds appears to be independent of whether fund 
has client ties with portfolio company, but noting that funds with multiple client have are generally more 
likley to vote in favor of management). 
 
153 Gretchen Morgenson, Investors Vs. Pfizer: Guess Who Has the Guns?, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 2006, at. 
Sec. 3, p. 1 (noting several mutual funds who own shares of Pfizer and manage one of its retirement plan 
and substantial fees paid by company to these funds). 
 
154 See Black, supra note 25, at 602. 
 
155 Letter to SEC cited in William Baue, Biting the Hand That Feeds: Mutual Fund Ties to Corporate 
Clients Can Affect Proxy Voting, SocialFunds.com Mar. 10, 2005  available at 
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/article1659.html. (citing to Bogle but also to a Fidelity 
spokesman who disclaims link). 
 
156 Do Mutual Funds Back CEO Pay, Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at C1. 
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d. Concluding Remarks 
 
The actual activities of mutual funds are consistent with our analysis.  Mutual 
funds have shied away from the more costly and more confrontational modes of activism: 
they have not instigated proxy context, they have not lead the charge in pushing for 
changes in business strategy or management, most mutual funds have not even made 
shareholder proposals, and until recently mutual funds have rarely been active in 
opposing or triggering corporate control transactions.  If they engage in “behind the 
scenes” communications – and we doubt that they do so extensively – it is largely just 
that: efforts to coax management to change its ways, without much follow-up if 
management is not amenable. Capitalizing on their economies of scale, however, mutual 
funds have developed general policies that have lead them to support shareholder 
governance proposals brought by others, withhold votes from board nominees, and 
oppose some governance proposals made by the board. 
 
B. Public Pension Funds and Monitoring 
 
 Like mutual funds, public pension funds enjoy significant economies of scale.  
The average member of the Council of Institutional Investors, an organization of large 
public pension funds as well as union and corporate pension funds, has assets of $22 
billion.  On the minus side, however, the reasons that raise concerns about the ability of 
public pension funds to act as effective corporate monitors differ from those related to 
mutual funds. Public pension funds must make quarterly disclosures of their holdings of 
public equity securities.157  But, unlike mutual funds, public pension funds are not subject 
to specific diversification requirements,158 face predictable liquidity requirements, and 
are not subject to regulatory constraints on performance fees, and have no business ties 
with portfolio companies that would be jeopardized by activism.  
 
 The problem of public pension funds, rather, is that they are political entities and 
subject to political constraints and political conflicts of interest. The make-up of the 
trustees of public pension funds is established by state law and differs from fund to fund.  
Generally, trustees consist of gubernatorial appointees, elected politicians who serve ex 
officio, officials elected by fund beneficiaries, or some combination of these groups.159  
For example, the trustees of CalPERS, the largest public fund, include 6 members elected 
by beneficiaries and 3 political appointees and 4 members who serve ex officio.160  The 
New York State Common Retirement Fund, the second largest public fund, has the State 
                                                 
157  See infra Section II.C.2. 
 
158 Public pension funds are subject to a prudent investor standard for diversification, see Romano, supra 
note 116.  But given their size, this should not be an effective constraint on their ability to take large 
positions in portfolio companies.  
 
159 Romano, supra note 116, at 823 – 825. 
 
160 See www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/organization/board/structure-responsibilities.xml. 
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Comptroller, a state-wide elected official, as the sole trustee. As should be evident, public 
pension fund trustees lack significant financial incentives to maximize fund performance. 
 
To be sure, public pension funds can hire professional managers compensated by 
performance-based fees.161  Public pension funds, however, are subject to political 
constraints in setting the size of these fees.  As officials who are, as some commentators 
have noted, “accountable for their decisions to politicians or to the press”,162 they avoid 
calling negative publicity to their activities. The adverse publicity generated by the pay 
packages of the managers of Harvard University’s endowment provides some indication 
of these constraints.  Though Jack Meyer, Harvard’s top investment manager, produced 
“stellar investment results,”163 alumni complained that the pay of Meyer and of some of 
his top managers was inappropriately high.  Meyer and some of his employees ended up 
leaving Harvard to start a hedge fund.164  By private sector standards, however -- and 
certainly by hedge fund standards165 -- Meyer’s pay package ($7 million in 2004) and the 
one of his top two managers ($35 million in 2003 and $25 million in 2004) was laughably 
small considering the fact that Harvard’s endowment of $22 billion would have been $12 
billion smaller had Meyer earned median returns.166  Indeed, the compensation of 
administrators of public pension funds is less frequently based on performance – and if it 
is, is less performance sensitive – than the compensation of administrators of private 
plans.167
 
Given the potential pitfalls from high pay packages, a politically safer course for 
pension fund boards that are willing to pay steep performance fees would be to entrust 
funds to an outside entity rather than to pay such fees to in-house managers.  This, of 
course, is exactly what public pension funds do when they manage the indexed portion of 
                                                 
161 CalPERS pays performance fees to some of its external managers. See CalPers Annual investment 
Report 2005, External Manager Fees Report, available at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/invest/investmentreport-2005/investment_operations/external-manager-fees.asp 
and http://www.benefitnews.com/retire/detail.cfm?id=8871. 
 
162 Kevin Murphy & Karen Van Nuys, Governance, Behavior, and Performance of State and Corporate 
Pension Funds, Harvard University Working Paper, 1994, at 14. 
 
163 Harvard’s High-Paid Star Investor Is Leaving, Boston Globe Jan. 12, 2005.  
 
164 Peter Grant & Rebecca Buckman, Fatter Pay Lures University Endowment Chiefs, Wall St. J., June 27, 
2006, at C1.  
 
165 See infra Section II.C.2. 
 
166  At Harvard, A Question Of Compensation, Boston Globe, Nov. 29, 2004; see generally Fatter Pay 
Lures University Endowment Chiefs, supra note 164. 
 
167 See Tracie Woidtke, Agents Watching Agents? Evidence from Pension Fund Ownership and Firm 
Value, 63 J. Fin. Econ. 99, 104 (2002). 
 
   27
their portfolio in-house and invest some of their other assets in private equity funds, 
venture capital funds -- and hedge funds.168
 
Political constraints also inhibit public pension funds from pursuing some of the 
more aggressive activist strategies employed by hedge funds.  It is one thing for public 
pension funds to sponsor shareholder resolutions demanding greater board accountability, 
to act as lead plaintiffs in securities lawsuits, or even to demand governance changes in 
underperforming companies.  It is quite another for them to tell a CEO how to run her 
business – by opposing major strategic acquisitions, by demanding asset spin-offs, or by 
recommending a different business strategy – and threatening a proxy contest if 
management fails to be responsive.  Public pension funds just lack the legitimacy to push 
beyond relatively uncontroversial “motherhood and apple pie” issues.  Unlike CEOs or 
hedge fund managers, they do not have to go out to the market to compete for investment 
capital; their managers have little financial stake in their success; they are not subject to 
market penalties for failure; they are run by politicians, bureaucrats, and union 
representatives; and as political entities, they are subject to political pressure for 
overstepping their bounds. 
 
Compounding these political constraints are political conflicts of interests.  
Pension fund trustees who are gubernatorial appointees or elected politicians may be 
tempted to pursue political ends, rather than the maximization of investment returns.  In 
her 1993 article on pension fund activism, Roberta Romano details several instances of 
pension funds pursuing political goals rather than profits. In 1992, for example, the 
Illinois state treasurer and trustee of the pension fund threatened not to make future 
investments into KKR’s leveraged buyout fund unless KKR preserved jobs in an Illinois 
plant it was selling to its employees.169 The same year, Elizabeth Holzman, the New York 
City’s comptroller and the trustee of the city’s pension fund, publicized her active 
approach to corporate governance in her campaign for the Democratic nomination for 
New York’s senate seat.170  As related by Romano, both the New York and the California 
state pension funds have become subject to political pressure to tone down, and indeed 
did tone down, their governance activities.171 More recently, Alan Hevesi, the very active 
New York State Comptroller172 who is the sole trustee of the $115 billion New York 
                                                 
168 See, e.g., News Release, CalPERS Taps Blackstone Alternative Asset Management as Advisor to $1 
Billion Hedge Fund Program, May 15, 2001 (noting that CalPERS board agreed to establish a $1 billion 
hedge fund program in October 2000). 
 
169 Romano, supra note 116, at fn. 6 and 807. 
 
170  Id. at 822. 
 
171 Id. at 815-819.  See also Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 
69 N.C. L. Rev. 1135, 1141, n. 39 (1991) (discussing political fall-out when Wisconsin pension fund 
submitted management-critical proposal to GM when company considered expansion in Wisconsin). 
 
172 Arden Dale, New York Fund Sues Merck, Citing Vioxx, Stock Drop, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 2004  (noting 
that Hevesi is considered an activist comptroller and detailing suits he has filed). 
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State Common Retirement Fund,173 has been criticized both for pursuing political goals174 
and for having the fund hire law firms who made large contributions to his campaign.175
 
Trustees elected by fund beneficiaries are usually union representatives, who also 
have objectives that may conflict with the maximization of investment returns.176  For 
example, CalPERS, the largest and traditionally most active public pension fund, has 
come under increased criticism for the presence of union representatives on its board and 
the pro-union stance it has taken in various labor disputes.177   Even to the extent that 
public pension funds do not pursue political or labor goals, the relatively low pay and 
incentives of public pension fund executives raises the specter that their governance 
activities are designed more for self-promotion than to enhance returns.178
 
The political constraints and conflicts of public pension funds not only make them 
less likely to engage in certain kinds of activism, they can also make them less effective 
when they become active.  To the extent that public pension fund activism is perceived to 
be motivated politically or to serve the promotional interests of fund executives, other 
groups are less likely to support public funds when they become active.  Without such 
support, however, activism is less likely to affect changes in the portfolio companies.  
This, again, suggest that public funds will be most effective when their activism is 
perceived to be least affected by political or personal motives – such as with respect to 
uncontroversial “apple pie” issues – and thus be inclined to limit their activism to those 
issues. 
 
The actual activities of public pension funds correspond to these incentives and 
constraints.  Consistent with their lack of business relations with target companies and the 
                                                 
173  http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/index.htm.  (As of December 31, 2003). 
 
174  Editorial, Pension Fund Blackmail, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 2005, at A10 (arguing that Hevesi was using his 
clout as pension fund trustee to aid John Kerry).  
 
175 Karen Donovan, Legal Reform Turns a Steward Into an Activist, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2005, at C1; 
Editorial, Comptrolling Legal Authority, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 2005, at p. A10; Editorial, Hevesi by the 
Letter, New York Sun, Apr. 12, 2005, online: http://www.nysun.com/article/12070.  See also Woidtke, 
supra note 167, at 128 (concluding that public pension fund activism is  motivated more by political and 
social goals than by firm performance). 
 
176  See generally Editorial, Pension Fund Blackmail, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 2005, at A10 (arguing that the 
“AFL-CIO and its friends are now using pension funds to advance their political goals).; Michael 
Schroeder, Council of Institutional Investors is Set to Focus on Morgan Stanley, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 2005. 
 
177 See Jonathan Weil, Gadfly Activism at CalPERS leads to Possible Ouster of President, Wall St. J., Dec. 
1, 2004, at A1 (noting controversial CalPERS actions in interceding on behalf of striking employees of a 
portfolio company); Editorial, CalPERS and Cronyism, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 2004, at A18 (noting political 
and union ties of CalPERS board members and accusing board of basing investment decision on political 
goals of labor and the Democratic party)., Jim Carlton & Jonathan Weil, Ouster Isn't Expected To Alter 
Calpers Policy, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 2004, at C3. (noting that CalPERS has been criticized for “meddling in 
political and labor-union issues with little connection to improving shareholder returns.”) 
 
178 Romano, supra note 116, at 822, fn. 822 (suggesting that veteran activist Dale Hanson, the former head 
of CalPERS, may have been so motivated); Black, supra note 25, at 598. 
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political interests of some trustees, public pension fund activism is somewhat more open 
and confrontational than activism by mutual fund: public funds make more shareholder 
proposals, publish lists of target companies, and apply to become lead plaintiffs in 
securities class actions.  But the choice of targets – companies that have been 
underperforming or have been accused of major fraud – and the substance of activism – 
calling for greater board accountability, opposing excessive CEO compensation, and the 
like – insulate the fund from political backlash.  And – as they lack the incentives and the 
credibility to do so -- public funds have steered clear of demanding specific changes in 
strategy or management, have not engaged in proxy contests, and have so far not even 
joined forces with hedge funds in opposing or triggering corporate control transactions. 
 
 C. Hedge Funds and Monitoring 
 
 1. Size 
 
Since hedge funds are largely unregulated, substantially less data is available 
about hedge funds than about other institutional investors.  However, the available 
evidence suggests that hedge funds enjoy significant economies of scale.  According to 
estimates, there are approximately 8,000 hedge funds with aggregate assets under 
management of over $1 trillion.179 These figures indicate suggest that the average hedge 
fund had assets of about $100 million.  The largest hedge funds have assets of about $10 
billion.180  While smaller than the comparable figures for mutual funds and pension 
funds, these figures probably understate the effective assets of hedge funds.  Unlike 
mutual funds and pension funds, hedge funds regularly use leverage and invest in 
derivatives which enable them to take positions that are much larger than those of mutual 
funds with similar net assets.  Thus, according to industry sources, 30% of hedge funds 
use a leverage ratio in excess of 2 – meaning that the total dollars invested are more than 
twice the total equity – and another 40% use leverage at a lower ratio.181
 
 2. Regulatory Constraints 
 
Hedge funds are not subject to any specific regulatory constraints.  They must, 
however, comply with rules applicable to investors generally.  These constraints include 
the disclosure requirements under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act requiring 
disclosures by persons who own more than 5% of the equity securities of a public 
company and the short-swing profit rules under Section 16(b) applicable to 10% 
shareholders and directors of a company.   
 
                                                 
 
179 The Economist, Hedge Funds and the SEC: Still Free, July 1, 2006, at 68.
 
180 Institutional Investor Magazine’s Alpha Names Farralon Capital Mgmt the World’s Largest Hedge Fund 
Firm in their Annual Hedge Fund 100, PRNewswire, May 27, 2005. 
 
181  See www.hedgefund.com/abouthhfs/attributes/Leverage/leverage.htm. 
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In addition, all institutional investment managers – including hedge fund 
managers – are subject to the disclosure requirement of section 13(f) of the Securities 
Exchange Act.  Under that provision, certain investment managers (including mutual 
fund as well as pension fund and hedge fund managers) must make disclosures about 
their holdings on a quarterly basis. The disclosure requirements under Section 13(f) 
differ, however, from those applicable to mutual funds in two important respects.  First, 
and most significantly, only holdings of registered equity securities – so-called “13(f) 
securities” need to be disclosed.  13(f) securities include traded shares and options listed 
on an exchange.  Importantly, however, holdings of other options and derivatives need 
not be disclosed in one’s 13(f) filings.  As a result, hedge funds can use derivatives to 
accumulate large economic positions in portfolio companies without disclosure unless 
they become subject to the disclosure requirements under section 13(d). Secondly, no 
disclosures at all must be made if one’s holdings of 13(f) securities are less than $100 
million. Thus, small and even medium size hedge funds can avoid making any 
disclosures as long as a sufficiently large percentage of their holdings are in debt 
securities or in non-listed equity derivatives. 
 
Hedge funds also have a greater ability to invest in illiquid assets than do mutual 
funds.  While mutual funds are required to redeem shares on short notice and SEC 
guidelines limit the percentage of assets that mutual funds can hold in illiquid 
investments, hedge funds are not subject to any similar regulatory requirements.  
Contractually, hedge fund investors have more limited withdrawal rights than mutual 
fund investor.  Traditionally, hedge fund investors could make withdrawals only after an 
initial lock-up period of six months.  More recently, some hedge funds have extended the 
initial lock-up period to two years or longer.182   Once the initial lock-up has expired, 
further restrictions apply.  In particular, hedge funds usually require advance notice for 
withdrawals and sometimes permit withdrawals only at specific points in time and 
impose limit on the amounts an investor can withdraw at any point.183  In addition, hedge 
funds may refuse a withdrawal request if the withdrawal would be harmful to other 
investor in the fund or “pay” a requested withdrawal “in-kind” rather than in cash.184  In 
conjunction, these provisions make hedge funds much less sensitive to sudden liquidity 
shocks than mutual funds are.185
                                                 
182  See, e.g., Ex-Chairman of S.E.C. Set to Start Hedge Fund, N.Y. Times, Sep. 13, 2005 at C1 (reporting 
that investors in new hedge fund can only redeem initial funds after 2 years, and thereafter only annually); 
Hedge Funds Avoid SEC Registration Rule, Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 2005, at C1 (noting that several hedge 
funds have adopted a 2-year lockup period, in part to avoid SEC registration rules).  The increased lock-up 
may contribute to hedge fund activism.  See Two-Year Lock-Up for hedge Funds Seen as Promoting 
Activist Strategies, BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., Apr. 3, 2006 at 569. 
 
183 Henny Sender, Citadel Pulls Up its Withdrawal Bridge, As Hedge Funds Aim to Block the Exits, Wall 
St. J., Jan. 13, 2006, at C1 (noting that Citadel charged penalty on investor who wanted to withdraw more 
than 3% of its money). 
 
184  Interview with Nathan Fischel, Jan. 2, 2006.  
 
185 Hedge funds also have a greater ability to take on debt than mutual funds.  Under the Investment 
Company Act, mutual funds are required to have a three to one asset to debt ratio. Investment Company 
Act, §18(f), 15 USC 80a-18(f).  (As most mutual funds have no debt to speak of, this regulatory constraint 
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  3. Incentives to Monitor 
 
As we discussed above, traditional institutional investors suffer from impaired 
incentives to monitor portfolio companies.  The incentives to monitor by hedge funds 
differ in several important respects from those of traditional institutions.  First, hedge 
fund managers are highly incentivized to maximize the returns to fund investors.  The 
standard hedge fund charges a base fee equal to 1-2% of the assets under management 
and a significant incentive fee, typically 20% of the profits earned.186  This fee structure 
gives hedge fund managers very significant stakes in the financial success of the fund’s 
investments.  These stakes are even higher when, as is frequently the case, a hedge fund 
manager has invested a significant portion of her personal wealth in the hedge fund.187
 
Secondly, many hedge funds strive to achieve high absolute returns, rather than 
returns relative to a benchmark.188  In particular, the industry-standard 20% incentive fee 
is usually based on a fund’s absolute performance.  And while a few funds use a hurdle 
rate before the incentive fee is payable, this hurdle rate is generally a rate based on the 
yield of debt securities, not a rate based on the performance of a market index or an index 
of hedge funds with similar investment objectives.    
 
Thus, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds benefit directly and substantially from 
achieving high absolute returns.  For successful managers, the resulting profits can be 
extraordinary high. Thus, the average take home pay for the top 25 hedge fund managers 
in 2003 was $207 million; and the lowest paid manager in that group still earned a 
respectable $65 million.189  For 2004, the average was $251 million and the lowest paid 
received $100 million.190
 
Of course, hedge fund managers, like mutual fund managers, care also about 
retaining existing and attracting new investors through their performance. But even to the 
extent that hedge fund performance is, for this purpose, assessed relative to a benchmark 
or to other hedge funds with comparable strategies, their incentives are diluted to a lesser 
                                                                                                                                                 
in unlikely to be binding.)  Hedge funds are not similarly limited and, by all accounts, often are far more 
leveraged. 
 
186  See www.hedgefund.com/abouthhfs/what/what.htm.  This fee is usually structured to incorporate a 
high-water mark, but not a claw back.  I.e., if a fund makes losses, these losses have to be made up before 
any incentive fee is payable (high water mark); but if a fund makes profits and earns an incentive fee, the 
fee does not have to be returned if the fund suffers subsequent losses (no claw back). 
 
187 E-Mail from David Haarmeyer to Marcel Kahan, Apr. 4, 2006. 
 
188 Financial Services Authority, Hedge Funds: A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement (June 
2005) at 10. 
 
189  Stephen Taub, The Buck Stops Here, Institutional Investor, Aug. 2004, at 47. 
 
190  Stephen Taub, Alpha’s Top 25, Institutional Investor’s Alpha, May/June 2005, at 15. 
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extent than those of mutual funds.  The reason is that hedge fund portfolios resemble the 
relevant index much less than those of mutual funds.  Reliable data on hedge fund 
holdings are not available since hedge funds must only disclose their holding in equity 
securities and listed options, and not any other derivatives.  We are thus not able to 
calculate the percentage dilution in hedge fund incentives similarly to the way we 
calculated Magellan’s dilution in incentives.  But hedge fund managers we talked to 
confirmed that hedge fund investments were definitely much more eclectic and less 
correlated with a market index or with investments of another hedge fund with a similar 
investment style than those of mutual funds.191 As one of them put it: Eclecticism “is 
what we are selling.”192  As a result, hedge funds need not worry much that competitor 
funds will free-ride on their governance activism and get higher returns with lower costs.   
 
And even if the activism by one hedge fund boosts the returns of activist hedge 
funds more generally, the result may not be all that bad.  Investors use returns of funds 
with a certain investment style to determine the amount of money they invest in this 
sector of funds.  If activism by one activist hedge fund boosts the returns of activist hedge 
funds more generally, more money will flow into this sector benefiting all activist 
funds.193
 
  4. Conflicts of Interest 
 
Hedge funds suffer from fewer conflicts of interests between fund managers and 
fund investors than traditional institutional investors.  First, most hedge funds are 
independent investment vehicles and are not affiliated with any other institution.  Of the 
20 largest hedge funds in 2004, only one was affiliated with another financial institution 
such as a bank or insurance company.  By contrast, as reported above, of the 20 largest 
mutual fund complexes in 2003, nine were so affiliated. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that even hedge funds that are affiliated with other financial institutions do not 
shy away from taking actions that are antagonistic to investment banking clients of their 
affiliates. Recently, for example, the Highbridge Fund, majority owned by J.P. Morgan, 
accumulated a 25+ percent stake in convertible bonds of Saks Inc. and then sent a “notice 
of default” when Saks breached a covenant by failing to file financial statements with the 
SEC – even though Saks has an investment banking relationship with J.P. Morgan.194 
                                                 
191  Interview of Hedge Fund Manager (anonymous), Jan 30, 2006.  
 
192 Id. Hedge funds specializing in merger arbitrage may be an exception in this regard in that their 
investments are highly correlated with those of other hedge funds specializing in merger arbitrage.  
 
193 Moreover, investors in hedge funds tend to be highly sophisticated.  As a result, they may tend to use 
more complex evaluation criteria and channel their investment to the funds that took the lead in activism, 
and not those that free-rode. 
 
194  Highbridge Fund Sent Default Note to Retailer Saks, Wall St. J., June 20, 2005 at C5 (the article further 
suggests that Highbridge bets on Saks stock declining and aims to make money from a short position in 
Saks). 
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Indeed, recently concern has been expressed that investment banks sacrifice the interests 
of other clients in order to cultivate and retain lucrative hedge fund business.195
 
Second, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds do not manage companies’ defined 
contribution plans.  They accordingly do not have to be concerned that activism will 
result in a loss of fund management business.  In sum, hedge funds are, to a much greater 
extent than mutual funds, free from the most significant potential sources of conflicts of 
interest.196
 
To be sure, hedge funds may still face some conflicts to the extent they want to 
attract contributions by defined benefit corporate pension funds that are run by 
management-appointed trustees.  (Mutual funds, of course, would also face similar 
conflicts.) But we believe that, at least for hedge funds, these conflicts tend to be minor.  
For one, hedge funds may not be that interested in capital from private pension funds.  If 
private pension funds, together with public pension funds, account for more than 25% of 
the capital of a hedge fund, the hedge fund becomes subject to regulations under 
ERISA197 – a fate unattractive to a sector that is otherwise largely unregulated.  More 
importantly, however, we do not think that corporate pension funds have been or will 
become a substantial source of direct funds for hedge funds.  Historically, corporate 
pension funds have not been significant contributors to hedge funds.  Rather, hedge funds 
have obtained most of their capital from wealthy individuals and institutions such as 
foundations or university endowments.198  More recently, corporate (as well as public)199 
pension funds have started to make investments in hedge funds.  While we lack precise 
data, we do not believe that, at this point, corporate pension funds are a major source of 
                                                 
195  Testimony Concerning Hedge Funds by Susan Ferris Wyderko, Director, Office of Investor Education 
and AssistanceU.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Before the Subcommittee on Securities and 
Investment of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (May 16, 2006) 
(available at  the SEC website , http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts051606sfw.htm); FSA Bloodhounds 
Pursue Hedge Funds; Financial Services Authority, Securities Industry News (May 16, 2005).  
 
196 Cf. Attacks of the Hungry Hedge Funds, BusinessWeek online, Feb. 20, 2006 (noting that hedge funds, 
unlike mutual funds, are not trying to sell money management services to companies). 
 
197  Department of Labor, Definition of ``plan assets''-- plan investments (“Plan Asset Regulations”), 29 
C.F.R. Sec.2510.3-101(f). (cf. http://www.dol.gov/dol/allcfr/Title_29/Part_2510/29CFR2510.3-101.htm 
and http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/0527637a-386d-4edd-b83b-
b4babc648872/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a8795ffd-7839-4515-8787-
d058684f9ae2/eceb_092004.pdf). 
 
198  Jason Singer, Ivy Leave: Yale Parts Ways with Hedge Funds, Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 2006, at C1 (chart 
noting that 25.7% of Yale’s endowment is invested in hedge funds). 
 
199 News Release, CalPERS Taps Blackstone Alternative Asset Management as Advisor to $1 Billion 
Hedge Fund Program, May 15, 2001 (noting that CalPERS board agreed to establish a $1 billion hedge 
fund program in October 2000). 
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capital for hedge funds.200 And given the declining importance of corporate defined 
benefit plans,201 we are skeptical that they ever will become one. Finally, even to the 
extent that corporate pension funds invest in hedge funds, they tend to do so through 
funds-of-funds, rather than directly.202  But hedge fund managers do not know the 
identity of the investor in the fund-of-funds, and investors in the fund-of-funds do not 
always know what hedge funds their money flows to. The presence of fund-of-funds thus 
serves to further insulate hedge funds from pressure by corporate pension funds.  
 
Whatever residual conflicts of interest may remain, they have to be compared to 
the affirmative incentives to enhance investor returns.  As explained, hedge fund 
management firms and managers derive substantially greater benefits from increased 
fund returns than do mutual fund management firms and managers. As a result, any 
conflict of interest is more likely to be resolved in favor of hedge fund investors.  On the 
whole, therefore, we do not believe that conflicts of interests are likely to interfere with 
activism by hedge funds, or at the very least that they do so much less than in the case of 
public pension funds and mutual funds. 
 
5. Activism and Stakes 
 
 In the end, the incentives for a fund to engage in activism depend on its stake in a 
portfolio company.203  In this regard, it is noteworthy that activist hedge funds usually 
accumulate stakes in portfolio companies in order to engage in activism. There are 
numerous examples of hedge funds taking stakes whose value depends on firm actions, 
and then taking action – everything from trying to influence strategy, running proxy 
contests, instigating litigation, and threatened to vote against mergers – to determine the 
outcome.   
 
 Hedge funds in this regard differ markedly from mutual funds and public pension 
funds.  Mutual fund and public pension fund activism, if it occurs, tends to be intermittent 
and ex post: when fund management notes that portfolio companies are underperforming, 
                                                 
200 The Hennessee Group recently estimated that public and private pension funds combined account for 
9% of the sources of capital to hedge funds.  See Hennessee Group LLC Hedge Fund Industry Growth, 
January 2005. 
 
201  In 1995, private pension funds held corporate equities of $1.3 trillion, amounting to 15% of the total 
market value of corporate equities.  By 2005, private pension funds held corporate equities of $1.7 trillion, 
amounting to 9% of the total market value of corporate equities.   Flow of Funds Accounts, supra note 128, 
tables L213 and L118. 
 
202 Jane B. Kenney et al., The Hedge Fund, Institutional Investor, June 1, 2003 (“Much of the new pension 
money enters the market through funds of hedge funds.”) 
 
203 In addition, hedge funds may structure their portfolios so that they profit from activism in various ways.  
As discussed below, for example, it is likely that Highfields stood to profit from a defeat of the MONY – 
AXA merger both through its holdings on MONY shares and through its holdings of ORANs. On the plus 
side, this can allow hedge funds to increase their returns from successful activism thereby overcoming 
rational apathy or free riding.  See infra Section III.A.2. 
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or that their governance regime is deficient, they will sometimes become active.204  In 
contrast, hedge fund activism is strategic and ex ante: hedge fund managers first 
determine whether a company would benefit from activism, then take a position, and then 
become active.  It represents a blurring of the line between risk arbitrage and battles over 
corporate strategy and control. 
 
This suggests that the differences in activism between hedge funds and other 
institutions may be, at least in part, endogenous.  Because (activist) hedge funds pursue 
activism as a profit-making strategy, they take economic positions in portfolio companies 
that enable them to make profits from activism and engage in activism.  Because 
traditional institutions do not pursue activism as a profit making strategy, they do not take 
positions for the purpose of becoming active and accordingly engage in less activism.  
Put differently, the difference in activism is, in part, due to the fact that hedge funds and 
traditional institutions pursue different profit strategies.  
 
Viewed from this perspective, the relevant question becomes why (some) hedge 
funds pursue activism as a strategy and why (most) traditional institutions do not.  In part, 
the answer to this question may lie in the fact that traditional institutions face regulatory 
barriers, political constraints, or conflicts of interest that make activism less profitable 
than it is for hedge funds.   
 
But in part, the difference in strategies may be due to the fact that mutual fund 
view and market themselves as vehicles for diversification which enable their investor to 
gain broad exposure to markets at low costs. To be a successful activist, it is probably 
helpful for a fund to engage in activism as a principal strategy: activism presumably 
entails learning, with funds that have done more of it becoming better at it, and funds 
with an activist reputation can more easily attract support from other investors and induce 
management changes.  But an activist strategy does not mesh well with a diversification 
objective because strategic activism is relatively expensive and requires a fund to take 
relatively large positions in relatively few companies.  Hedge funds, by contrast, do not 
see themselves as vehicles for diversification and engage in targeted hedges, rather than 
diversification, to eliminate unwanted risk.205  More narrowly tailored strategies -- such 
as activism – are thus more appropriate for hedge funds than for mutual funds.206
                                                 
204 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 112, at 231 (describing target selection process used by CalPERS). 
 
205 Perhaps more importantly, hedge funds have less of a need to diversify because investors in hedge 
funds, unlike many investors in mutual fund, are already substantially diversified through their other 
holdings.  Put differently, hedge fund investors have a greater tolerance for risk generated by their hedge 
fund investment than mutual fund investors have with respect to their mutual fund investment.  
 
206 Even non-activist hedge funds tend to pursue more narrow tailored investment strategies such as merger 
arbitrage and convertible bond arbitrage.  Of course, some “multi-strategy” hedge funds pursue broader (or 
a combination of narrower) strategies and some mutual funds, such as sector funds, offer lesser 
diversification benefits.  (By the same token, of course, some mutual funds, such as Mutual Beacon, are 
relatively activist.)  On the whole, however, the mutual fund sector is dominated by funds with broadly 
diversified portfolios while the hedge fund sector is characterized by funds with narrowly tailored 
strategies. 
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III. Problems Generated by Hedge Fund Activism: Conflicts and Stress  
 Fractures 
 
 Although hedge funds hold great promise as active shareholders, their intense 
involvement in corporate governance and control also raises some concerns.  Hedge 
funds are set up to make money for their investors without regard to whether the 
strategies they follow benefit shareholders generally. A hedge fund who owns shares in, 
say, company A, may try to use that position to increase the value of another position, say 
in company B, rather than to maximize the share price of company A.  Indeed, because 
hedge funds frequently engage in hedges and other sophisticated trading and arbitrage 
strategies, such conflicts of interest are likely to arise more frequently for hedge funds 
than for other institutional investors.  We examine these “hedging related conflicts” in 
Section A.   
 
 In addition to these direct conflicts, we also address a secondary problem related 
to hedge fund activism.  Hedge funds combine high powered incentives with great 
sophistication and access to vast pools of capital.  Together, this can put great stress on 
the existing governance system.  We examine some of these potential “stress fractures” in  
Section B.207   
 
 We conclude this Part by commenting in Section C on the absence, so far, of a 
third set of problems:  managers buying off activist hedge funds through the payment of 
greenmail or similar devices. We leave the most common, and potentially most serious, 
criticism leveled against hedge funds -- that hedge funds, due to their short-term trading 
horizons, aggravate an already serious problem of “short termism” in the executive suite 
– to be analyzed in Part IV. 
 
 In assessing the need for a regulatory response to these problems, there are several 
considerations.  First, to what extent does the existing regulatory structure adequately 
address the concerns?  Here, we consider whether the problems are of a familiar type, and 
then whether the increased pressure on the system imposed by hedge funds overwhelms 
the existing tools.  When a problem is a standard corporate law problem, we presume that 
the existing regulatory structure is adequate unless some specific aspect of hedge fund 
involvement changes the analysis.  If, on the other hand, problems are of a new type, they 
may require new tools.   
 
 If one concludes that the current structure is inadequate, one then needs to 
consider which of the various tools available is most appropriate.  In this regard, there are 
three general categories of potential responses. One can rely on market forces (e.g. 
                                                 
207 We do not concern ourselves with the extent to which the interests of hedge fund managers may diverge 
from the interest of hedge fund investors, or what to do about any such divergence. Although an important 
question, it is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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competition among hedge funds, reputation), employ self-help (charter amendments, 
contracts), or resort to regulation.   
 
 While the specific response obviously depends on the specific nature of the 
problem, it is critical to bear in mind that hedge fund activism is not static.  Hedge funds 
are among the most nimble market actors, with a track record of coming up with new 
strategies, some of which are designed to exploit imperfections in the very responses 
developed to the old strategies. Moreover, hedge funds are not only clever, but quick.  So 
in choosing a mode of response, speed and flexibility are very important.  This suggests 
that the market forces and self-help are better designed to deal with these problems than 
regulation is. The reason is two-fold.  For one, private actors can generally react more 
quickly than regulators.  Second, private actors have a greater ability to learn from each 
other in devising a proper response. 
 
 As we will see, many of the problems discussed in this Part are familiar and 
classic corporate law problems.   Despite the increased pressure applied by hedge funds, 
our general view is that the traditional solutions, perhaps with increased enforcement, and 
supplemented by market responses and possibly some additional disclosure requirements, 
should suffice.  We are not indifferent to the possibility of illegal or improper behavior; 
rather our view is that the current regulatory structure can handle it, with minor 
exceptions. 
 
 A.  The Dark Side: Hedging-Related Conflicts 
   
  1. Buying (Control) v. Selling (Shares) 
 
As the earlier anecdotes show, hedge funds are sometimes potential buyers, not 
sellers. When a hedge fund is a potential buyer of a company in which it has a stake, its 
interests clearly and obviously diverge from those of its fellow shareholders: the hedge 
fund wants to buy at the lowest possible price while the other shareholders want to sell at 
the highest possible price.  A hedge fund’s activities may not be so much directed at 
making sure that the target is sold at the highest price, but rather at increasing the 
likelihood that the hedge fund succeeds in its acquisition attempt.   
 
This is a very old problem in corporate law that is analyzed under the rubric of the 
duty of loyalty.  While hedge funds’ interests clearly diverge from general shareholder 
interests when they are seeking to buy control, this conflict is obvious, with management 
and other shareholders being aware of it and on guard against it.  Moreover, hedge funds 
will generally have no control over the target company they are trying to buy.  We 
therefore believe that no special response is necessary.   
  
 2.  Conflicts in Merger Votes 
 
A more subtle conflict can arise in control transactions when a hedge fund owns 
other securities the value of which depends on whether the transaction is consummated.  
Such conflicts featured prominently in the proposed acquisition of MONY, a publicly 
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traded life insurance company, by AXA, the large French financial conglomerate, where 
hedge funds both favoring and opposing the deal had conflicts of interest.208  Highfields -
- a hedge fund with nearly 5% of MONY -- led the opposition by MONY shareholders, 
running full page ads in the Wall Street Journal urging MONY shareholders to reject the 
merger,209 convincing Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory firm, to 
recommend a “no” vote on the deal,210 and establishing a website 
(www.demandfairvalue.com) to aid MONY shareholders in exercising their appraisal 
rights.211   
 
But Highfields’ interests were not pure. In order to finance its cash acquisition of 
MONY, AXA had issued a convertible debt security, known as “ORANs”, to its 
shareholders which would convert into AXA shares on completion of the acquisition but 
be redeemed at face value plus interest if the acquisition was not completed by December 
21, 2004.  Given the relative values involved, the ORANs would be significantly more 
valuable if the AXA-MONY deal went through.  Highfields held a large short position in 
ORANs, a position that would become more valuable if the merger did not close. 212 
Other hedge funds favoring the merger, in turn, were long on ORANs and apparently 
purchased MONY stock at a premium in order to vote for the merger.213  Eventually, 
after a postponement in the meeting (which allowed shareholders who had bought stock 
                                                 
 
208 In re MONY Group Inc. S'holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 668 (Del. Ch. April 9 2004, revised Apr. 14, 
2004). 
 
209 Sara Hansard, MONY Delays Vote as Dissidents' Effort Gains Steam; CRAIN COMM., Feb. 23, 2004, at 
25.  Highfields even mailed a letter to shareholders urging them to vote “no” on the merger and enclosed a 
duplicate of the corporate proxy card so that shareholders, should they choose, could easily cast a no vote. 
This was the subject of federal court litigation with the issue being whether this constituted an exempt 
solicitation under Rule 14a-2(b)(1). MONY Group, Inc. v. Highfields Capital Mgmt., L.P., 368 F.3d 138, 
141 (2nd Cir. 2004).  Highfields won in the District Court, but the decision was reversed by the Second 
Circuit which held that, under the circumstances, the duplicate management proxy card was a “form of 
revocation” and thus rendered the solicitation non-exempt. Id. at 145 ; see also In re MONY Group Inc. 
S'holder Litig., 853 A.2d at 669; .Southeastern Asset Management Demands That AXA/MONY Disclose 
Information Regarding Arbitrage of AXA Bonds [hereinafter Southeastern Asset Management Demands]; 
BUS. WIRE, Apr. 30, 2004, http://www.businesswire.com. 
 
210 Hansard, supra note 209, at 43.  “ISS said the sale price ‘is outside the boundary of reasonableness when 
compared to precedent transactions coupled with open-market opportunities to sell above the offer price.’”  
Id.     
 
211 Highfields Capital Establishes Web Site for MONY Shareholders Exercising Appraisal Rights, PR 
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 31, 2004, http://www.prnewswire.com. 
 
212 In re MONY Group Inc. S'holder Litig., 853 A.2d at 668. 
 
213 Innisfree Presentation, supra note 27.  In a presentation to the MONY board, CSFB, the Board’s 
independent financial advisor, “noted that as of the Board meeting, anyone long ORANs would receive an 
approximate 46% profit if the merger was consummated, compared to a 2.4% profit if it was not.” 853 
A.2d at 671 n.29. 
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after the previous record date to vote) and much litigation, the MONY merger squeaked 
through, with 53.8% of the outstanding shares voting in favor.214
 
In a world in which more than fifty percent of all equities are held by institutional 
shareholders, such conflicts are pervasive.  But, while pervasive, they are not necessarily 
bad.  Index funds, for example, will own shares on both sides of many mergers between 
public companies.  In such cases, their financial interest will be to maximize the value of 
their portfolios and should approve a merger if it is value enhancing, without regard to 
the magnitude of the premia paid to shareholders, even if shareholders of individual 
firms, qua shareholders, might prefer higher premia.  Where hedge funds differ, and 
potentially exacerbate the pervasive conflicts, is that they choose to invest in both sides 
of a deal and acquire stakes in order to influence the outcome, in contrast to index funds 
which simply find themselves on both sides.   
 
Corporate law has long lived with, and tolerated, conflicts of interest in voting by 
shareholders.  Hedge funds may be more likely to have such conflicts than traditional 
institutional investors and may choose to create such conflicts, but the conflicts of hedge 
funds pale compared to the conflicts of controlling shareholders in freeze-outs, whose 
votes will usually be outcome-determinative.  And controlling shareholders are entitled to 
vote their shares in their (conflicted) self-interest, unencumbered by any fiduciary duties 
to minority shareholders.215   
 
As such, we see little need to impose stricter duties on hedge funds or on voting 
conflicts more generally. 216  Absent empty voting, the effect of conflicted votes is self-
limiting;217 conflicted funds are often on both sides of the contested issue and their votes 
thus cancel each other out;218 the market is often aware of, and can respond to, these 
conflicts; all diversified shareholders, including all institutional investors, will often find 
themselves with similar conflicts; and the board of directors, which does have fiduciary 
duties, can take measures to counteract any dangers.219
 
                                                 
 
214 Floyd Norris, Holders of MONY Approve $1.5 Billion Sale to AXA, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2005, at C4 
(noting that  “[e]ssential to approval may have been a block of 8.7 percent of the shares owned by Deutsche 
Bank”).   
 
215 Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp, 535 A.2d 840 (Del. 1987). 
 
216 We suspect that a more common occurrence is that hedge funds have economic interests that are 
disproportionate to their voting interest as a result of options of other derivatives which have a value that 
correlates with the stock price but no voting rights. 
 
217 As long as the economic interest of a hedge fund corresponds at least to the voting rights, the hedge fund 
will suffer proportionally with other shareholders from any value decline. 
 
218 See also Section III.A.3 (discussion of conflicts in King-Mylan merger vote). 
 
219 In our working paper, “The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting,” we address potential responses to 
empty voting and other conflicted voting in greater detail.   
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  3. Empty Voting 
 
A particularly extreme form of a hedging-related conflict arose in the proposed 
Mylan/King merger.  In July 2004, Mylan Laboratories entered into a merger agreement 
with King Pharmaceutical, according to which, subject to shareholder approval, Mylan 
would acquire King for Mylan shares.  Perry, a hedge fund, was a large shareholder in 
King (approximately 7 million shares) and supported the merger.  While the deal was 
seen as favorable to King, the market reaction to the merger for Mylan was negative and 
some large shareholders of Mylan, including Carl Icahn, threatened to vote against it.  As 
a result, approval of the merger by Mylan shareholders was in doubt.220
 
Perry then acquired 9.9% of Mylan’s shares.  At the same time, Perry apparently 
entered into “equity swaps” with Bear Stearns and Goldman Sachs which fully hedged its 
economic exposure to Mylan’s share price.  As a result, Perry acquired shares -- and 
votes -- in Mylan, which, because it had no economic stake in Mylan, it could vote purely 
on the basis of his interest as a King shareholder – and thus in favor of the merger.221 
Indeed, this was presumably Perry’s purpose. 
 
The divergence between the interests of Perry and those of other Mylan 
shareholders is evident.  If the merger is good for King but bad for Mylan, as many 
Mylan shareholders apparently felt, Perry would still vote its sizeable position in Mylan 
in favor of the merger and could help push it through.  As it happened, King had to 
restate its earnings, which caused Mylan management to terminate the merger agreement.  
The success, and legal validity, of Perry’s strategy thus was not tested.222
 
“Empty voting” is an example of an old problem – conflicts of interests created by 
exploiting the separation of legal and beneficial ownership – aggravated by modern 
financial innovation.  Perry took advantage of modern financial instruments to acquire 
votes.  While, functionally, Perry’s actions appear to be a form of “vote buying,” legally 
they do not seem to fall with the existing jurisprudential framework.  Indeed, as we argue 
                                                 
220 Robert Steyer, New Player Joins Mylan-King Fray, The Street.com, Nov. 29, 2004. 
 
221 The issues relating to empty voting are extensively discussed in Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, 
Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 775, and Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and 
Hidden Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, (April 2006), U. of Texas Law, Law and Econ 
Research Paper No. 70, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=887183. 
 
222 Other, more traditional conflicts of interest in voting were also present.  Icahn had a stake of about 10% 
in Mylan, both in terms of economic exposure and in terms of voting rights.  But Icahn also had a shorted 
5.3 million shares of King stock.  Icahn Wins as Mylan-King deal Dies, Forbes.com Newsletter, Mar. 4, 
2005.  Icahn could thus have an economic interest to oppose the merger, even if the merger were in the 
interest of Mylan, as long as the market thought that the merger would be significantly more beneficial to 
King.  In that event, Icahn would gain more from a defeat of the merger through his short position in King 
than he lost on account of his long position in Mylan.  Suppose Icahn shorted the King shares at $30 per 
share, that the shares would go up to $40 per share if the merger is completed but down to $20 per share if 
the merger fails.  Icahn would then profit from defeating the merger if his profits from shorting are greater 
than the increase in the value of his Mylan stake from approving the merger. 
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at greater length elsewhere, the existing regulatory structure does not prohibit it. If empty 
voting turns out to be a significant problem – and it is not clear that it is – new measures 
will be required, either through regulation or by common law decision making.   
 
That said, how exactly the law should be changed, if it should be, is a highly 
complex question.  This complexity arises from several directions: multiple mechanisms 
can generate empty votes; current legal rules do not treat these mechanisms equivalently; 
other problems related to compilation of broker votes interact with the concerns raised by 
empty voting; and, at present, neither the market, nor companies, nor regulators have the 
information necessary to determine the presence and extent of empty voting schemes.   
 
The development of a proper response is made even more complicated by the fact 
that companies and investors have an interest in determining the outcome of a vote 
speedily.  Thus, any more intrusive legal regime that involves protracted litigation 
generates special problems in the context of voting rules.  Moreover, it is unclear to what 
extent market responses (such as the increasing costliness of hedging strategies around 
critical votes) temper empty voting.  We address these issues in a companion paper in 
which we examine the extent to which the existing technology and regulation of voting is 
sufficient given the pressures imposed by current activity.  For the purposes of this 
Article, we agree with Henry Hu and Bernie Black that not enough is known about the 
extent of empty voting to prescribe anything more than possibly an increase in disclosure  
of schemes generating empty votes.223
 
  B. Stress Fractures 
 
With billions of dollars available, and super high powered incentive compensation 
structures, hedge funds put stress on the existing governance structures.  In doing so, they 
highlight and exacerbate existing structural weaknesses, albeit not necessarily in a 
manner that generates a conflict of interest with other shareholders. In this Section, we 
address two such potential weaknesses:  undisclosed concerted action and overvoting. 
 
  1. Undisclosed Concerted Action 
 
In many of the battles between managers and hedge funds described earlier, the 
shareholder base of companies can change almost overnight with hedge funds 
collectively sometimes ending up with more than 50% of the shares.  Managers and their 
counsel have speculated that hedge funds act in concert, both in the acquisition of their 
shares and in the subsequent pressuring of management, without filing the required 
disclosure statements under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act.  Indeed, say 
some, there is a pervasive problem of section 13(d) underenforcement by the SEC. 
 
We do not know whether this is true or not.  If there is, in fact, a problem of 
underreporting, it presents an interesting parallel with the 1980s.  During that period in 
which hostile tender offers assumed prominence, management complained that hostile 
                                                 
223 Hu & Black, supra note 221. 
 
   42
bidders and their allies operated behind the scenes to the disadvantage of shareholders 
and companies.  Now, again, one hears complaints that it is hedge funds (some run by the 
same raiders who managers complained about in the 1980s) that are operating behind the 
scenes.  
 
But there is an important difference between non-disclosure by raiders in the 
1980s and any non-disclosure by activist hedge funds today.  The acquisition of a 5% 
stake by a raider was highly material, market-moving information.  By delaying a 13(d) 
filing, raiders and their allies would be able to acquire additional shares at a substantially 
lower price.  By contrast, hedge fund activism has much less of an immediate market 
impact.  Moreover, hedge fund corporate governance activities, in any event, are usually 
conducted publicly , with hedge funds issuing press releases long before they reach the 
five percent filing threshold under Section 13(d).  Finally, hedge funds (unlike most 
raiders) must disclose their equity holdings quarterly under Section 13(f).  Thus, while 
hedge funds, like all other investors, ought to comply with 13(d), one wonders what all 
the fuss about a failure to disclose is about. 
 
To be sure, a 13(d) filing can yield information that would otherwise not become 
public. Specifically, a 13(d) filing could reveal the presence of a conflict of interest, such 
as an empty voting scheme.224  Indeed, it was this 13(d) requirement that forced Perry to 
reveal its hedging positions in the Mylan King battle.  Where such conflicts exist, and 
would have to be disclosed in a 13(d) filing, a failure to make the filing constitutes a 
serious problem.  But it does not appear that such conflicts are common. 
 
In addition, most poison pills incorporate the 13(d) concept of a group into the pill 
trigger.  Thus, it may sometimes be the case that an undisclosed formation of a “group” 
would trigger the pill – to the serious harm of the participating hedge funds and, one 
assumes, to the delight of management and their lawyers.225  In that case, however, 
management is in a good position to respond: it can argue that the hedge funds have 
formed a group, declare the pill triggered, dilute down the members of the alleged group, 
and wait to be sued.  Given the incentives for management to pursue such cases, this does 
not seem to be area to which the SEC need devote its limited enforcement resources. 
 
The key issue here thus seems to us not a failure of the SEC to bring enforcement 
actions but the vagueness of the concept of “group” underlying section 13(d) and the 
poison pill.  Rule 13d-5 provides that “when two or more persons agree to act together 
for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of equity securities of an issuer, 
the group formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership.”226 
                                                 
224 Section 13(d) requires the disclosure of any contracts and other arrangements in which hedge fund 
dispose of their economic interests.  Securities Exchange Act, Section 13(d)(1)(E).  But section 13(d) does 
not have a per se requirement to disclose conflicts of interest. 
 
225 Phyllis Plitch, Lawyers See No Poison Pill to Feed Hedge Fund ‘Wolf Packs’, Corporate Governance, 
Dec. 21, 2005, at 4.  
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Section 13(d)’s reporting obligations are thus triggered by concerted conduct, but not by 
parallel action. The fact that a variety of hedge funds crowd into the shares of a company 
at the same time does not per se establish the formation of a group any more than the 
mere fact that competing manufacturers raise their prices at the same time can establish a 
price fixing agreement in violation of the Sherman Act.  Proving that parallel conduct is 
concerted action is difficult, both in the antitrust and in the 13(d) context.  
 
 To that extent, hedge fund activism may raise a somewhat novel problem.  Up to 
recently, the issue of unaffiliated parties acting in parallel to influence a public company 
– and the accompanying evidentiary ambiguity as to whether a group has been formed --
has not arisen that often.  Rather than bring more enforcement actions, the SEC may want 
to provide regulatory clarification of when a group is formed. 
 
  2. Overvoting 
 
The current voting technology is seriously flawed.  Some argue that it is so flawed 
that, in any reasonably close corporate vote – the number of which are increasing with 
increasing hedge fund involvement – it would be impossible to prove which side has 
prevailed.   
 
Since 1973, to avoid the overwhelming record keeping problems of paper shares, 
companies use a book entry system, with share certificates held by the Depositary Trust 
and Clearing Corporation (DTCC).  Individual brokerage houses each have accounts with 
DTCC in which, under the standard arrangements between customers and their brokerage 
firms, holdings of customers are commingled in a single, fungible mass.  DTCC’s records 
simply indicate that Merrill Lynch, for example, has 20,000 shares of Firm X, without 
indicating how many shares specific customers of Merrill hold. As Merrill Lynch’s 
customers buy and sell, Merrill’s net holdings will change, but it is Merrill’s 
responsibility to keep track of its customers’ holdings.   
 
 When it comes time for the shareholders of X Corp. to vote, the company will 
typically retain a firm, usually ADP, to handle the distribution of proxy materials, the 
solicitation of proxies, and the tabulation of the votes.227  ADP receives a listing of 
holdings by brokerage house from DTCC and a list of customers’ accounts from the 
participant firms.  It will then send out proxy materials, including proxy cards indicating 
the number of shares in a customers account, to all those who appear on brokers’ lists.  
Customers will fill out their cards, return them to ADP, with the results then passed on to 
the firm. 
 
 This system breaks down when there is significant short selling, as is often the 
case when hedge funds are involved.  Consider what happens when someone “shorts” a 
                                                 
227 Typically, firms will retain ADP Investor Communications Services which claims a 95% market share.  
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stock.228  In a short sale, a brokerage house typically arranges for a short seller to acquire 
shares from a custodian bank which holds shares (in a fungible mass) for its custodial 
clients (such as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies), subject to an 
obligation to return a share at some later date.229  The short seller will then sell the shares 
to some third party, who will take full title and be entirely oblivious to the source of the 
shares.   
 
 Because a short sale involves an actual transfer of shares, it creates substantial 
difficulties in determining who has a right to vote shares, principally because tracing is 
not possible, and record keeping and communication is incomplete.230  Suppose that 
Merrill has 20,000 shares of X in its DTCC account, while Goldman has 30,000 shares in 
its account.  A hedge fund HF “borrows” 5,000 shares from Merrill and, to go short, sells 
them to a customer of Goldman.  Once that sale is completed, DTCC records will show 
that Merrill has 15,000 shares of X while Goldman has 35,000 shares.   
 
 The problem is now clear:  DTCC’s omnibus proxy will transfer the right to vote 
15,000 shares to Merrill, and inform ADP of this.  But Merrill will give ADP a list of all 
its customers’ holdings in Firm X for a total of 20,000 shares.  ADP will then send out 
proxy materials according to the brokers’ customer lists, with the result that it will send 
out proxy cards for more shares than are in fact entitled to vote. In this example, although 
Merrill and Goldman collectively only hold 50,000 shares, their customers will receive 
proxy cards representing 55,000 shares.  Because the shorted shares are often not 
attributed to specific customer accounts, it is unclear which customers are entitled to 
vote.  If fewer than 15,000 Merrill shares are voted, this problem is shoved under the 
table by pretending that the Merrill customers who returned proxies were all entitled to 
vote and some of those who did not return proxies anyhow were not entitled to vote.  But 
if more proxies for more shares are returned than are entitled to vote – because the level 
of short-selling was high and the abstention rate was low – it is unclear what should be 
done. 
 
 There are several possible effects of this system for collecting votes. First, it may 
mean that some people who are shareholders are unable to vote their shares.  Second, it 
may mean that others who may not in fact own any shares (because they lend them out) 
will nonetheless be able to vote.  Finally, it may result in a situation in which there is no 
answer to the question of who is entitled to vote. 
 
 The MONY/AXA deal, discussed above, is an example of a contested transaction 
that illustrates these problems.  The controversial buyout was approved by a margin of 
                                                 
228 For an excellent account, see Robert C. Apfel, John E. Parsons, G. William Schwert & Geoffrey S. 
Stewart, Short Sales, Damages and Class Certification in 10b-5 Actions, Working Paper July 2001, 
available from SSRN. 
 
229 Christopher C. Geczy, David K. Musto & Adam Reed, Stocks are Special Too: An analysis of the equity 
lending market, 66 J. Fin. Econ. 241 (2002). 
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1.7 million votes out of a total of 50.1 million shares at a time when somewhere around 
6.2 million shares had been shorted.231   
 
 Though the overvoting problem has been noted for a long time,232  it is becoming 
more acute now because hedge funds activism makes close votes more likely and hedge 
funds engage in short selling at the time of votes. We discuss the problem in greater 
detail, and examine possible solutions, in a separate paper. 
   
  C. The Absence (So Far) Of a Third Conflict: Paying Hedge   
Funds Off 
 
It is worth noting that we have not found any evidence for the existence of a third 
potential conflict between hedge funds and other investors: hedge funds and managers 
making a side deal in which the firm pays the hedge fund to go away, such as greenmail.  
We are not aware of a single instance of hedge funds receiving greenmail, one of the 
1980’s classic instances of “dark side” behavior.  The absence of greenmail is interesting 
in its own right.  One possible explanation is that greenmail got such a bad name during 
the 1980s that hedge funds are too embarrassed to touch it, or perhaps more plausibly that 
boards are too embarrassed to offer it. Alternatively, the absence of greenmail or similar 
devices may reflect the fact that there are so many hedge funds around that greenmail or 
similar devices will not provide firms with any protection and may well elicit even 
greater interest.  Or finally, accepting greenmail may not be in the long-term interest of 
activist hedge funds because it would undermine their credibility and their ability to 
obtain the support of other investors (which they may need to succeed in their activism) 
the next time around.  
 
 
  IV. Pervasive Short Termism?  
 
 Although many of the “dark side” problems identified in Part III have generated 
comment and controversy, the sharpest and most comprehensive criticism of hedge fund 
activism is that they exacerbate an already serious problem of “short termism” in the 
executive suite.  In this Part, we take that criticism seriously. 
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  A. A Real Problem? 
 
Hedge funds come close to being the archetypical short-term investor.233  For 
some funds, holding shares for a full day represents a “long term” investment.  Short-
termism may thus pervade much that hedge funds do, including their corporate 
governance and control activism. Leading opponents of hedge fund activism, such a 
Martin Lipton, argue that hedge fund short-termism could cause managers not to make 
crucial long-term investments.234  And the German finance ministry set up a panel to 
assess the impact and consider regulations of “short-term profit oriented foreign 
investors.”235  One’s views about whether hedge fund activism, on the whole, is desirable 
or undesirable are likely to turn on one’s stand on the short-termism problem.236    
 
Looking at the specific activities of hedge funds, there is often an inherent 
ambiguity as to whether they sacrifice valuable long-term projects in favor of short term 
gains.  Consider Deutsche Boerse’s (DB) failed attempt to acquire the London Stock 
Exchange, discussed earlier.  DB’s CEO wanted to acquire the LSE and convinced the 
board that doing so was a good idea. Hedge funds who had acquired large stakes in DB 
disagreed.  They maintained that the plan to acquire the LSE represented wasteful 
managerial empire building and that DB’s cash hoard should instead be distributed to 
shareholders.  Now, if the investment in acquiring the LSE was a valuable long-term 
project, then the involvement of the hedge funds had the effect of pushing the company 
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towards the lower value outcome, an outcome worse for long-term shareholders than 
acquiring the LSE.  If the hedge funds were right that the investment was simply a bad 
investment driven by delusions of grandeur, their opposition benefited both short-term 
and long-term shareholders.237
 
For the short-term trading horizon of hedge funds to generate a short-term 
investment outlook for hedge fund managers, the stock market must suffer from 
“myopia:” that is, it must undervalue long-term investments relative to short-term 
investments.  If the market does not itself suffer from such a bias, then the interests of 
investors with short-term trading horizons will not conflict with those of investors with 
long-term trading horizons.  In the case of the DB’s attempt to acquire LSE, for example, 
a conflict between hedge funds with short-term trading horizons and other investors with 
long-term horizon would exists only if the market myopically fails to incorporate the 
long-term benefits of acquiring LSE into the stock price of DB.   
 
Whether and under what circumstances the market suffers from myopia has been 
the subject of substantial analysis and debate.  Many managers, directors, private equity 
funds, investment bankers and others involved in the management and sale of companies 
are convinced that the market is myopic.  Others believe that the short-term/long-term 
distinction is a foil for managerial failure to deliver results.238 Academics have developed 
theoretical models showing that market myopia can result in a number of 
circumstances.239  Much of the current research in finance starts from the assumption that 
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capital markets are not perfectly efficient.240  But the empirical evidence on the extent 
and magnitude of myopia is sketchy at best.241   
 
Arguably, the phenomenal growth of private equity funds, whose basic business 
model includes taking companies private so that they can be reconfigured away from the 
short term pressures on public companies, indicates that there may well be a serious 
problem of myopia.  KKR, Blackstone, Carlyle, Apollo and TPG have all raised, or are 
currently raising, new funds in excess of $10 billion.242  But then again, the business 
model of private equity funds also includes providing high-powered incentives to 
managers and monitoring them closely.  Whether private equity and activist hedge funds 
pursue complementary strategies for maximizing firm value (with both targeting 
managerial agency costs in a different fashion), whether they are competitors in the same 
markets (as private equity funds open hedge funds and hedge funds take companies 
                                                 
240 For a short survey, see Michael Wachter, Takeover Law when Financial Markets are (Only) Relatively 
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private), or whether hedge funds aggravate market imperfections and thus drive firms 
into the arms of private equity remains unclear. 
 
Short-termism thus presents the potentially most important, most controversial, 
most ambiguous, and most complex problem associated with hedge fund activism.  The 
other dark side problems represent relatively isolated and narrow concerns that do not 
much relate to hedge fund activism as a whole. Short-termism, by contrast, arguably 
pervades hedge fund activism and the accusation that hedge funds induce managerial 
short-termism has become the main line of attack for hedge fund critics.  At the same 
time, the very existence of a short-termism problem is least proven; its manifestations, if 
it does exist, are most manifold; and potential solutions are least evident.  
 
  B. Potential Responses? 
 
Let us assume that hedge fund managers tend to prefer that companies engage in 
projects with short-term payoffs even if there are projects with longer term payoffs that 
are more valuable.  Should the law intervene and, if so, how? 
 
The answer to this question depends on a number of factors.  First, even if hedge 
funds have short-term biases, to what extent is hedge funds activism driven by excessive 
short-termism?  Activist hedge funds are agents of change with specific goals that depend 
on the particular company. When the company is diversified, hedge funds often push for 
divestitures.  When it is underperforming, they often push for the sale of the company or 
a change in management.  When the company has excess cash on hand, they push for 
stock repurchases or dividends. When the company has assets on its balance sheet that 
can be monetized (e.g., real estate), they push to monetize those assets. When companies 
are pursuing capital intensive investment plans, hedge funds sometimes oppose the plans 
and push for the cash to be returned to shareholders.  In the control area, hedge funds 
sometimes make bids, sometimes oppose deals on the acquirer side (but sometimes try to 
push for deals), and often try to get better terms for the target.  Is it always the case, when 
a hedge fund gets involved, that it is pushing for business strategies with a short-term 
pay-off over strategies with a more valuable long-term pay-off? Or is the short-term 
payoff preferred by hedge funds sometimes the more valuable one?  And how often is 
hedge-fund activism motivated by altogether different concerns, such a bad management, 
an ill-advised strategy, or an insufficient price in an acquisition?243 Is the controversy 
really about different investment horizons or does it instead reflect a substantive dispute 
over the appropriate course of action for the firm? 
 
Second, how long is the horizon of managers?  A plausible story can be told that 
it is managers, and not (just) markets, which suffer these days from myopia.  Many CEOs 
are close to retirement age and, even among younger CEOs, turnover is high.  Executive 
stock options continually vest and are exercised or hedged, if only to diversify their 
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portfolio.  Bonuses are often based on short-term performance goals.  Is it sometimes 
management’s failure to invest in valuable long-term projects that created the opening for 
hedge fund activism? 
 
Third, when and to what extent do hedge funds succeed in affecting corporate 
policy? Though hedge funds have become highly active in the corporate governance area, 
they have generally not become powerful enough to exercise control over the targets of 
their activism.244  Rather, they purchase a sizeable but far from controlling stake – rarely 
more than 5% to 10% -- and then seek to influence corporate strategies.245  Even when 
hedge funds commence a proxy contest, they usually seek only minority representation 
on the board.  Activist hedge funds often have a chair at the metaphorical table where 
corporate strategy is set: an opportunity to have their views heard and paid attention to. 
But in order to see their views prevail, hedge funds usually need the support of others246 -
- which cannot be taken for granted.247 These others include, in particular, corporate 
management, independent directors, traditional institutional investors with large stakes, 
and other large shareholders.  To the extent that the largest shareholders are effectively 
indexers, a strategy that results in a short term increase in share prices (that benefits 
hedge funds) but a long term loss (that hurts long term shareholders) will not be 
attractive. More generally, over time, the degree of support that hedge funds receive will 
likely depend on whether long term shareholders benefit. 
 
Fourth, if the determination of corporate policy once hedge funds are involved 
depends on multiple constituents, how do these constituents interact?  At present, it 
seems that hedge funds often act as a counterweight to the substantial power of 
management, with the consequence that the effective power is partly shifted to other 
groups, such as independent directors and traditional institutional investors.  Independent 
directors and large shareholders, of course, may sometimes make mistakes, but 
management is not infallible either. We are inclined to be optimistic about the resulting 
interaction, which often results in a compromise rather than outright victory for hedge 
funds or management.248  But another possibility – though one that we have so far not 
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witnessed – is that hedge funds will enter an unholy alliance, either by being bought off 
by management through the payment of greenmail or its functional equivalent or by 
teaming up with other large shareholders to advance their respective parochial interests to 
the detriment of shareholders at large.  
 
Given these questions, a sufficient case for legal intervention has not been made.  
Our conclusion partly results from the uncertainties, about whether short-termism is a 
real problem, about the nature of the problem, about how much it affects hedge fund 
activism, and about how hedge fund activism relates to potential managerial short-
termism. It partly results from our observations that, at present, hedge funds influence but 
do not control corporate policy, that they depend on the support of other shareholders, 
and that they have shied away from extracting greenmail and other similar unsavory 
tactics.   
 
But our conclusion rests to a large extent on our view, which we have developed 
elsewhere,249 that companies (and the market more generally) will take what we have 
called “adaptive devices” to deal with the potential negative effects of hedge fund short-
termism.  To see the shape of some of these devices, one need look no further than the 
“Hedge Fund Attack Response Checklist” mailed by Martin Lipton to the clients of his 
firm.  In this widely circulated memo, Lipton recommends that companies prepare in 
advance for hedge fund activism by: periodic updates of the board of directors; review of 
dividend policy; improved financial public relations; consistency in one’s strategic 
message; proactively addressing reasons for any shortfall in peer company benchmarks; 
regular, close contact with major institutional investors; a review of basic strategy with 
the board; and so on.250  These are terrific ideas, not just to deal with activist hedge funds, 
but in general.  If companies follow Lipton’s advice, hedge funds will already have made 
significant positive contributions to the management of U.S. companies.  Moreover, if 
hedge funds can succeed despite companies taking these measures, we think that chances 
are reasonably high that they have a good point.   
 
One adaptive device missing from Lipton’s list – but one which merits particular 
attention – is private equity.  Vast sums are now available to take companies private, 
sums largely provided by the same (allegedly myopic) institutional investors who hold 
the shares of public companies -- and invest in hedge funds.  And as we have noted 
above, private equity can be an escape mechanism for companies that suffer from 
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excessive short-term pressures in the public market.251  If it is indeed hedge funds that 
contribute substantially to such short-term pressures, it is no small irony that hedge funds 
and traditional private equity funds are nowadays converging. In an increasing number of 
high-profile deals, hedge funds have taken on the type of long-term control investing that 
has previously been the exclusive domain of private equity funds.252  If hedge funds are 
part of the problem because their activism exacerbates short-termism, they may be also 
part of the solution, as they develop private equity expertise.  This by itself shows how 
multi-faceted hedge funds are as an investment vehicle, and should caution against 
adopting hasty regulation. 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
We are observing an evolutionary process in real time.  Hedge funds -- highly 
incentivized, mostly unconflicted, and largely unencumbered by regulatory constraints --  
have become the prime corporate governance and control activists.  They pursue activism 
as a profit-making strategy, make investments in order to become activist, rather than as 
an afterthought to a failed portfolio investment, and thus blur the line between risk 
arbitrage and governance and control battles.  The emergence of, and the role played by, 
hedge funds proves that there is money to be made from being an active shareholder. 
 
One of the most intriguing developments we are starting to observe is the division 
of labor between the hedge funds and the more traditional institutional investors.  
Because hedge funds are typically relatively undiversified, they show little interest in 
agitating for systemic changes such as anti-poison pill or staggered board campaigns.  On 
the other hand, hedge funds – highly incentivized and subject to few conflicts of interests 
-- engage in firm specific agitation to a degree unheard of among traditional institutional 
investors, with traditional institutions sometimes tagging along. As one traditional 
institution said, in connection with the battle to stop Deutsche Boerse’s attempt to acquire 
the London Stock Exchange, “The hedge funds have done a marvelous job. No matter 
how we feel about companies, traditional managers simply cannot move as fast to 
achieve our aims. We were right behind (the hedge funds), but we couldn't have done it 
without them.”253
 
But there is also a potential downside to activism.  The interests of hedge funds 
sometimes diverge from those of their fellow shareholders and activism creates stress 
fractures for the regulatory system.  The most serious accusation leveled against activist 
funds, however, is that activism is designed to achieve a short-term payoff at the expense 
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of long-term profitability.  It is here where the challenge for boards, traditional 
institutional investors, and the market as a whole lies.  If the proposals made by hedge 
funds are sometimes valuable and sometimes misguided, how good are we in figuring out 
which is which?   While we do not pretend to know the answer to this question, we 
believe that market forces and adaptive devices taken by companies individually in 
response to activism are better designed to help separate good ideas from bad ones than 
additional regulation. 
  
Hedge funds are here to stay.  They are prominent in control transactions and 
elsewhere.  Their influence is being felt.  But the future is uncertain.  As hedge funds 
grow, will they retain their separate identity (and get stronger) or will (some of them) 
morph into high-fee mutual funds?  Will activist investment opportunities for hedge 
funds dry up as more money chases these opportunities, or will more hedge funds 
become activist in response to the profits to be earned?  If smart hedge fund investors 
keep hedge fund managers honest, will expansion of investor base reduce the monitoring 
of hedge fund managers and make them less good agents for their investors?   
 
Finally, one can predict a backlash, although the exact form it takes will depend 
on what scandal occasions the regulatory intervention.  We are already beginning to see a 
regulatory reaction with the SEC, with a (failed) attempt to adopt rules requiring the 
regulation of hedge fund advisers,254 and preparation for regulation in Europe.  When 
there is the inevitable crisis, there will be pressure to regulate further.  At this point, the 
most important injunction, obvious in a period of calm but less so after an explosion, is to 
regulate cautiously and carefully.   
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